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Abstract
This dissertation examines the relationship between the perceived fairness in executive
compensation and the level of earnings management on the one hand and the propensity for
voluntary turnover on the other. Executive compensation has attracted significant academic
attention for more than two decades. The ratcheting-up of executive pay raises questions about
its determinants and whether the pay-setting process effectively promotes managerial behavior
that aligns with the interests of shareholders. Alternatively, executives may simply extract rents
at the expense of shareholders because of the informational advantage that they have and their
influence over the board of directors, particularly the compensation committee (e.g., Daily et
al. 1998; Newman and Mozes 1999; Anderson and Bizjak 2003). Because executives play a
vital role in the success of their businesses, I argue that it is important to analyze whether the
perceived fairness in their compensation affects their organizational behavior, particularly in
areas that relate directly to the health of their firms.
The results of previous research on the relationship between executive compensation and
earnings management have been inconclusive. Some studies have found that executive
compensation is positively related to earnings management (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon
2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007), while others have argued that this relationship
is insignificant (e.g., Erickson et al. 2006; Armstrong et al. 2010).
While executives who perceive they are unfairly compensated may use earnings
management to increase their performance-based pay, they may, alternatively, voluntarily quit
a firm in order to find a position which they deem to give a fairer reward. With regard to
3

voluntary turnover, some research finds that executive compensation, as a sign of managerial
power, is negatively related to voluntary turnover (e.g., Song and Wan 2019); but Bloom and
Michel (2002) disagree with this, arguing that although executive compensation is not related
to executive turnover, it is positively related to the turnover of lower-level employees.
Consequently, alternative theories offer the opportunity of complementarily explaining the
nature of these relationships.
In summary, my dissertation is structured as follows: in Chapter 1 I present a structured
review of the literature on the relationship between earnings management and executive
compensation and describe how social comparison theory can provide a more nuanced
understanding of this relationship; in Chapter 2, I develop an empirical measurement to capture
perceived fairness in executive compensation and to analyze its effect on earnings management;
and, in Chapter 3, I present the results of tests to determine whether perceived fairness
influences voluntary turnover. Below, I describe each chapter in more detail.
In Chapter 1, I first provide a detailed review of the academic literature on the relationship
between executive compensation and earning management. I then discuss the theoretical
background of organizational justice theory (i.e., social comparison theory) and integrate this
theory into agency theory to better explain the association between executive compensation
and earnings management (e.g., Rupp et al 2017; Abernethy et al. 2017). I argue that by
considering perceived fairness in executive compensation, certain opportunistic managerial
behavior can be avoided. In empirical research, by incorporating perceived fairness in the
regression explaining the relationship between executive compensation and certain managerial
4

behavior, I can more accurately quantify the impact of executive compensation on these
behaviors. Lastly, I identify potential research avenues that interested researchers could take to
further our understanding of this topic. This chapter lays the foundation for my subsequent
thesis chapters while also providing other avenues for future research.
In Chapter 2, I construct an empirical model that estimates the perceived fairness in
executive compensation based on the factors that are likely to be considered when perceiving
fairness, including firm fundamentals, the tenure and demographic characteristics of executives,
and corporate governance. I then regress total compensation on these variables and take the
residuals as the proxy for perceived fairness in executive compensation. According to social
comparison theory, perceived fairness is formed based on the comparison between one’s ratio
of inputs (e.g., efforts) over outcomes (e.g., compensation) and a comparison of this ratio to
that of their referent(s): individuals would feel unfairly treated if their ratio is higher than that
of their comparison base.
Next, I empirically examine whether perceived fairness in executive compensation is
associated with the level of earnings management. I choose earnings management as the way
to restore fairness to executives who perceive they are unfairly compensated, because the
manipulation of earnings can increase the outcome of the ratio without significantly increasing
the inputs, that is, without exerting significant efforts in increasing a firm’s fundamental
performance. The empirical results are consistent with my expectation that executives who
perceive they are unfairly compensated manipulate earnings upward to restore fairness.
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In addition, I conduct several more analyses. Specifically, I test if perceived fairness also
affects the level of real earnings management, the perceived fairness of which is the component
of compensation executives value most, and, lastly, if chief executive officers (CEOs)1 also
use earnings management for the sake of fairness. In terms of robustness tests, I analyze if
perceived fairness also affects the level of accruals management in the next period, if the
incentive for earnings management only applies to executives who perceive they are undercompensated, and if the main result holds for an alternative measure of perceived fairness
(Cooper et al. 2016).
This chapter contributes to the existing body of research on the relationship between
executive compensation and earnings management (the literature) in three ways. Firstly, I
develop a new measure for estimating the perceived fairness in executive compensation and
use this measure to test if this measure of perceived fairness is related to the level of earnings
management. I find the results consistent with my hypothesis. Secondly, by incorporating social
comparison theory into this relationship, the mechanism of how executive compensation
affects the level of earnings management can be further understood. I argue that, due to the
mixed evidence in the literature on this topic, delving into explanations based on alternative
theories, other than agency theory, could be fruitful. Thirdly, the findings demonstrate that the
board of directors should consider fairness when determining compensation packages and
should compare the level and structure of executive compensation in their own firm to that of
firms with similar characteristics and individuals with similar demographics.

1

A chief executive officer (CEO) refers to the highest-ranked executive in a firm, and sometimes also serves on the board.
6

In Chapter 3, I examine whether perceived fairness in executive compensation affects the
propensity for voluntary turnover. Since earnings management may not be the only avenue for
executives to restore fairness, executives may take more extreme action. The results are
consistent with my expectation that executives who are more unfairly compensated have a
higher propensity for voluntary turnover. Further, my findings are robust when subjected to
alternative definitions of voluntary turnover and to different model specifications. Voluntary
turnover is driven by fairness in equity-based compensation rather than salary and bonus. The
analysis in Chapter 3 provides insight into understanding the managerial labor market and how
to retain scarce managerial talent, thus reducing costs associated with executive turnover.

7

1. Do Fairness Perceptions Matter in the Relationship between Earnings Management and
Executive Compensation: A Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
As highlighted by Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, “if not addressed soon, [earnings management] will have adverse consequences
for America’s financial reporting system” (Levitt, 1998). Earnings management is the
phenomenon that agents manipulate earnings in the income statement to fulfill certain purposes.
There are two types of earnings management: accruals earnings management, which
manipulates financial accruals and real activities management, which manipulates firm
operations (e.g., postponing R&D expenditures). The motivations identified in the literature
are diverse, including avoiding violating debt covenants, avoiding consecutive losses,
achieving earnings benchmarks (e.g., financial analysts’ forecasts), and increasing executive
compensation tied to firm performance, e.g., bonus, stock options, and restricted stocks, (see
Dechow et al. (2010) for a systematic review).
In this paper, I focus on the relationship between executive compensation and earnings
management. This relationship is usually explained in the literature using agency theory.
Specifically, executives with performance-based compensation are incentivized to engage in
earnings management for the sake of their personal wealth even at the expense of shareholders.
Yet, the premise of this explanation, that all earnings management is opportunistic, is
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challenged in the literature (Adut et al. 2013; Shu and Thomas 2019). Further, some empirical
findings cannot be predicted by agency theory (Armstrong et al. 2010; Li et al. 2016).
Based on the reasoning above, I argue that fairness theories, particularly social comparison
theory, can complementarily explain the relationship between executive compensation and
earnings management and enhance our understanding on the motivations for some managerial
behaviors that potentially harm firms’ operations. Consistent with my argument, the effects of
fairness perceptions on managerial behaviors are demonstrated by some recent studies (e.g.,
Salleh and Memon 2015; Abernethy et al. 2017). Depending on the costs of earnings
management, I also consider alternative actions (i.e., voluntary turnover) executives who
perceive they are unfairly compensated may take to restore fairness.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, social comparison theory provides a
more nuanced explanation for the relationship between executive compensation and earnings
management by “consider[ing] behavioral explanations in addition to the traditional economic
and agency rationalizations” (Armstrong et al. 2010, p.261). Secondly, considering fairness in
executive compensation could mitigate the potential adverse consequences (e.g., earnings
management and voluntary turnover) arising from incentive compensation in practice. Thirdly,
this paper provides several directions for future research on related topics by incorporating
fairness theories.
Organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I provide the definition of
earnings management. In Section 3, I focus on the relationship between earnings management
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and executive compensation, pointing out the challenges agency theory faces in explaining this
relationship. Section 4 examines the ways in which social comparison theory could provide a
more nuanced understanding on this relationship. Lastly, Section 5 suggests several directions
for further research.
1.2 Definition of earnings management
Earnings management is the manipulation of income numbers on financial statements. In some
instances, the manipulation may be intended to signal inside information on future cash flows,
thereby reducing information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders (Ronen and
Sadan, 1981). This manipulation is within generally accepted accounting principles (GAAPs).
However, earnings management is more commonly used to reduce transparency between
managers and outsiders using techniques outside of GAAPs to misrepresent a firm’s
fundamental performance (Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001). Consistent with this separation of
informative and opportunistic earnings management, Adut et al. (2013) separate predictive
earnings management as actions that increase the transparency on a firm’s future performance
from opportunistic earnings management as those that decrease it.
In the first instance, where earnings management is used as a signal to convey relevant
information about a firm’s fundamental performance to the market, the actions may be
beneficial to external stakeholders (Dechow 1994). For example, managers may choose to
capitalize the expenditure incurred in the maintenance of fixed assets instead of expensing it
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because they believe that capitalization better represents the fact that the firm benefits from the
maintenance for several periods.
Although researchers acknowledge that some within-GAAP earnings management is
advantageous, much of the literature focuses on the misrepresentation of the financial
performance of firms by use of earnings management. Researchers have found that earnings
management is positively related to the propensity to misreport (Burns and Kedia 2006) and
the restatements of financial reports (Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007).
There are two types of earnings management identified in the literature. The first type is
accruals management, wherein accruals are manipulated to achieve certain earnings targets
without direct cash flow consequences. This type of earnings management is generally proxied
by discretionary accruals. Examples include the manipulation of the provisions for warrants
and the cost allocation of fixed assets. The prominent feature of accruals management is that
the manipulation must be reversed in some future period.
The second type of earnings management is called real earnings management, which is
defined as the manipulation of operational (real) activities to affect earnings as well as cash
flows (Roychowdhury 2006). Examples include abnormal reductions in Research and
Development (R&D) expenditures and delays in spending on some projects with positive net
present value. Huang and Sun (2017) use a model adapted from Roychowdhury (2006) to
estimate the normal level of discretionary expenses2, and the mean-adjusted residuals are used
2

Discretionary expenses in Huang and Sun (2017) include R&D expenses, advertising expenses, and selling, general, and
administrative expenses.
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as the abnormal level of discretionary expenses. In this case, smaller (more negative) residuals
indicate a larger cut in discretionary expenditures.
The motivation to engage in earnings management may arise from the desire to benefit the
firm, or to enhance the personal wealth of a manager at the expense of shareholders (Schipper
1989). Executive compensation, particularly incentive compensation, has been identified in the
literature as one of the most prominent incentives for both accruals and real earnings
management (e.g., Hsieh, Ren, and Lirely, 2016; Li, Holmes, and Lee, 2016; Park, 2019).
1.3 Executive compensation as an incentive for earnings management
Jensen and Meckling (1976) had a profound influence on the structure of executive
compensation, as evidenced by a surge in incentive pay that has been witnessed since the 1980s.
Executive compensation typically contains salary, performance-based compensation (e.g.,
bonus, stock grants, stock options, and restricted stocks), and other benefits and perquisites
(Ellig 2002). The compensation packages are arranged by the compensation committee of the
board of directors. Yet, incentive compensation gives rise to the problem of earnings
management as managers manipulate earnings to increase their performance-based pay without
promoting their firm’s fundamental performance (e.g., Dye 1988; Trueman and Titman 1988).
In the early development of the literature on the relationship between executive compensation
and earnings management, researchers often motivated their studies and formed their
hypotheses on the basis of agency theory. For example, Healy (1985) is one of the first papers
that provides a relatively complete characterization of the incentive effect of bonus contracts
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on earnings management. He analyzes the relationship between performance targets and
fundamental performance under various formats of bonus contracts. The results suggest that
managers’ accrual choices are positively related to income-reporting incentives when their
compensation is within the bonus range.
While the literature on the relationship between earnings management and executive
compensation is vast, my interest is in studies published after the implementation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) since the structure of executive compensation changed
significantly after its passage. After SOX was enacted, the use of executive compensation based
on earnings became more prevalent (Carter et al. 2009). The reason is that although
performance-based pay in general has increased since the 1980s, before SOX firms were still
cautious about using performance-based pay tied to earnings because of the potential negativity
brought by it (e.g., earnings management). Yet, after SOX this negativity was mitigated due to
the requirement that senior corporate officers must personally certify that the firm’s financial
statements “comply with SEC disclosure requirements and fairly present in all material aspects
the operations and financial condition of the issuer.” (Section 302, SOX Act 2002). Recent
research has shown that both the amount and the type of earnings management have been
significantly altered after the passage of SOX. For example, Carter et al. (2009) find that the
amount of accruals earnings management has decreased in the post-SOX period. Similarly,
Cohen et al. (2008) find that firms shifted from accruals earnings management to real earnings
management due to the constrains imposed by SOX.
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In terms of the selection process for articles used in this review, I first used the terms
“earnings management” and “incentives” in titles, abstracts, and keywords in the Scopus 3
database, which yielded a result of 236 entries. I then decided to narrow the scope of the
journals included. More specifically, I selected 25 accounting journals based on the average
rankings of Australian Business Deans Council Journal Quality List 2019 (ABDC), Chartered
Association of Business Schools Academic Journal Guide 2018 (AJG), and SCImago journal
quartile and rank 2019 (Scimago). Table 1 provides the detailed journal list and ranking criteria.
Journals with an average score of eight or above were chosen and I believe that this list covers
the most influential journals and articles in accounting. With this restriction imposed on
journals, the result was reduced to 66 entries. Lastly, of the 66 papers, only 34 discuss
specifically the relationship between earnings management and executive compensation. I also
excluded papers which used sample data that predated SOX, but were published in or after
2002. Lastly, I read each paper and include the papers related to my research question. I
summarize the methodology, sample, sample period, research question(s), and key finding(s)
of these papers in Table 2.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
[Insert Table 2 around here]
The selected research in table 2 focuses on the relationship between executive
compensation and earnings management or the motivational effect of executive compensation
3

Scopus is a widely used search engine with more than 75 million records and 24,600 journals, with 32% (9,692) of which
are journals on social science.
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on earnings management. In the next section, I focus on two recent debates in this stream of
literature: the informational valence of earnings management and the direction of the
relationship between executive compensation and earnings management. Both debates
demonstrate that in order to move forward the understanding of this relationship, the principalagent approach needs supplementing with the more nuanced considerations that alternative
theories provide.
1.3.1 Informational valence of earnings management
After the passage of SOX, most research generally built on the premise that earnings
management is opportunistic in nature and motivated by pure self-interest. In other words,
executives use earnings management to enhance their personal wealth at the expense of
shareholder interests (e.g., Baker et al. 2003; Bartov and Mahanram 2004; Veenman et al. 2011).
This argument is applicable to both accruals-based and real activities earnings management
(e.g., Chan et al. 2015; Francis et al. 2016; Park 2017).
However, some recent research challenges this premise. For instance, Adut and colleagues
(2013) introduce the concept of informative earnings management, which is motivated by the
desire to convey information contained in reported earnings to outsiders. They found that while
firms’ future performance is negatively affected by opportunistic earnings management,
informative discretionary accruals enhance future firm performance as insider information is
conveyed to outsiders. Shu and Thomas (2019) also acknowledge the informativeness of
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earnings management by stating that stock holdings-induced earnings management reduces
information asymmetry between insiders and outside stakeholders.
1.3.2 Direction of the relationship between executive compensation and earnings
management
Executive compensation, particularly performance-based pay, induces managers to engage in
opportunistic behavior to enhance their compensation (Jensen 2005; Cheng and Farber 2008).
For example, the findings in the literature prior to SOX suggest a positive relationship between
earnings management and executive compensation (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al.
2007; Grant et al. 2009).
However, this explanation has been challenged by some recent research. Erickson et al.
(2006) compare executive stock incentives at firms accused of accounting fraud 4 by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with firms not accused of fraud during the period
of 1996-2003. They find no conclusive evidence that stock incentives are associated with
accounting fraud. Armstrong et al. (2010) examine whether stock holdings and stock
compensation provide incentives to manipulate financial reports. Consistent with Erickson et
al. (2006), they do not find evidence of a significant association between stock incentives and
accounting irregularities using propensity score matching. They emphasize that the empirical
evidence on the relationship between earnings management and executive compensation is
mixed. Thus, there is “difficulty in drawing general inferences regarding the association

Accounting fraud is considered an extreme case of earnings management, and the two groups of firms have similar
characteristics (e.g., firm performance, firm size, corporate governance, etc.).
4
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between equity incentives and accounting irregularities” (Armstrong et al., p.231). Further,
Adut et al. (2013) find that executive compensation is negatively correlated with opportunistic
earnings management. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction made in previous studies
that executives always maximize their utilities when they have incentives to do so. Li et al.
(2016) find that the relationship is moderated by the level of earnings management and
executive compensation. More specifically, the authors categorize executive compensation and
earnings management into high, medium, and low levels based on certain thresholds. They find
that the relationship becomes insignificant when CEO compensation and earnings management
are both high. The possible explanation is that when CEOs are highly compensated, due to
ethical concerns, they are much less incentivized to enhance their compensation further by
engaging in earnings management.
I argue that the debates on the incentives for earnings management and the direction of
the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management call for the need
to consider explanations based on alternative theories that complement the framework set by
agency theory. Recent research has incorporated concepts such as fairness and loyalty to
address some of the limitations of agency theory and its focus on utility maximization and
individual rationality (Kahneman et al. 1986). For instance, Abernethy et al. (2017) incorporate
concepts from the organizational justice literature to show that managers with performancebased pay engage in lower levels of opportunistic earnings management when they identify
with the firms for whom they work. In other words, researchers incorporating fairness into
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agency models acknowledge that pure self-interest is not the only motivation for opportunistic
behaviors (Fehr and Schimidt 2000; Fehr, Klein, and Schimidt 2001).
1.4 Mapping fairness theory to the relationship between executive compensation and
earnings management
For some time, researchers have recognized the instrumentality of social contexts (e.g.,
fairness) in motivating behaviors (Abernethy et al. 2017). Cohen et al. (2007) emphasize the
idea that context-specific factors help academics and practitioners understand the nature of
agency relationships, and the perception of fairness affects the propensity to engage in abusive
and opportunistic behaviors. In a related study, Luft (1997) pointed out that a utility function
represented by only wealth and leisure is insufficient in explaining accounting-related
behaviors. Similarly, Fehr and Schimidt (1999) developed a model to demonstrate that not all
people are exclusively pursuing material self-interests. According to them, fairness and social
goals can also be a motivation for behaviors.

Among the diverse streams of psychology-based literatures on human behavior,
organizational justice has been the most researched topic (Cropanzano and Greenberg 1997).
Therefore, it may be helpful to provide some background information on the origin of the
theory of fairness, and to show how this theory could be applicable in organizational settings.
1.4.1 The origin of social comparison theory
The literature on organizational justice builds on Festinger’s (1954) seminal work on
fairness theory, of which social comparison theory is the focus. Festinger (1954) argued that if
18

objective non-social means are not available, people tend to evaluate fairness in outcomes by
comparing them with others that are similar; this is defined as social comparison. He also
argued that there are incentives for people to take actions to reduce the discrepancy between
expected outcomes and actual outcomes derived from this process.

Weick (1966) extended this line of thinking with the argument that the actual behaviors of
human beings are sometimes inconsistent with the predictions dictated by individual rationality.
Nor can these predictions explain the findings that different individuals may have different
perceptions of the same situation (Adams 1965). Weick implicitly suggests the necessity of
using psychological theories, which are complementary to economic theories, to explain the
inconsistency in justice perceptions.

Another important refinement to Festinger’s (1954) general theory of justice came from
Homan’s (1961) identification of two distinct components: distributive justice and procedural
justice. The former is defined as the fairness of the distribution of rewards and costs, while the
latter is defined as the fairness of the procedure that determines the distribution. These two
factors are related to different aspects of executive compensation. While distributive justice
indicates the fairness in the compensation itself, procedural justice manifests in the procedures
used to determine executive compensation. Before I delve into the ways that fairness theory
can complement agency theory in explaining the motivation for earnings management, it is
important to show how the perception of unfairness develops.

19

The perception of unfairness in executive compensation develops in three steps. Firstly,
with the incentive to evaluate one’s compensation through social comparison theory (Festinger
1954), executives who are paid less than they expect to be would perceive themselves as
underpaid. Secondly, executives who have this perception are “relatively deprived of status and
feel less satisfied with the status” (Adams 1965, p.269). Therefore, a discrepancy between an
ex ante expectation and an actual outcome exists. In the third and last step, the dissatisfaction
stemming from perceived underpayment motivates an executive to take actions to reduce this
discrepancy.
The choice of referents plays an important role in the formation of fairness perceptions.
When social comparison theory is applied to an organizational setting, there is evidence that
employees, including management, take peers in similar firms as a benchmark to determine
whether the principal is treating them fairly (Matuszewski 2010, Miller et al. 2002). Miller et
al. (1988) suggest that individuals tend to regard another individual or groups of individuals as
peers when they have a shared identity, such as organizational or industrial membership. This
notion is supported by O’Reilly et al. (1988), who find that interlocked CEOs 5 use their
compensation as a CEO to benchmark executive compensation in firms where they serve as
directors.

5

An interlocked CEO means a member of one firm’s board of directors also serves as an CEO in another firm.
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1.4.2 The effect of executive compensation on perceived fairness
In the last two decades, accounting researchers have incorporated the concept of fairness in
studies of executive compensation. The interest in fairness and executive compensation has
increased since the passage of SOX. As an early study using alternative theories to explain
executive compensation, Bloom (2004) finds that psychological, social, and moral
considerations (e.g., fairness) affect the outcomes of compensation systems (e.g., the level and
structure of executive compensation). Furthermore, Harris (2009) states that executive
compensation is unfairly high and cannot discipline the opportunistic behavior of managers as
predicted by agency theory. Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Mohammad (2009) find that
performance-based compensation is not fair particularly in regard to stagnant firms. Though
most firms claim that stock options and stock grants are used as incentives to encourage
executives to enhance firm performance, in stagnant firms the sensitivity of pay-forperformance is low.
The ineffectiveness of executive compensation in curbing opportunistic behaviors was
reflected in the 2008 financial meltdown, and in response, the U.S. congress passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) in 2010. The DFA contains
several requirements regarding executive compensation and corporate governance, including
the disclosure of pay ratios, which is of particular interest in this chapter of the dissertation.
Implemented in 2017, firms are required to disclose the ratio between CEO pay and the median
pay of employees. CEO pay and CEO pay ratio affect the perceived fairness of CEO
compensation for outsiders’, e.g., consumers and shareholders, (Kelly and Seow 2016; Kelly
21

and Seow 2018). Additionally, they affect employees’ perceived fairness of both their own pay
and the compensation of their CEOs (Benedetti and Chen 2018). It is reasonable to assume
that CEO pay and CEO pay ratio are also a significant means for CEOs to compare their
compensation to their peers’ and to form fairness perceptions regarding their own pay. Though
the validity of this argument is an empirical question, some experimental studies find consistent
results that pay (van Yperen et al. 2005) and relative pay (Bracha et al. 2015) affect the
recipients’ fairness perceptions.
Beginning in 2006, the SEC required firms to disclose CFO (chief financial officers)
compensation in addition to CEO compensation in their annual reports. Although some
researchers began to pay attention to CFO compensation afterwards, accounting studies on the
fairness of CFO compensation are still largely unexplored. Anecdotally, an extremely high ratio
between CEO pay and the pay of medium-level employees exists (115-to-1, Crawford et al.
2021), and chief financial officers (CFOs)6 earn about a third of what CEOs earn (Robert Half,
2020). Due to the significant position a CFO hold in a firm’s operations and the non-trivial
compensation they earn, I believe that fairness in CFO compensation should also be of interest
to accounting researchers.
In this dissertation, I take a step further to analyze whether social comparison theory
provides a nuanced understanding of the relationship between earnings management and
executive compensation and if both CEOs and CFOs who perceive they are underpaid are

6

If the individual holds one of the following positions: CFO, chief financial officer, chief finance officer, treasurer,
controller, or vice president-finance, s/he is considered to be a CFO.
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incentivized to take action to restore fairness. In other words, it has been supported by some
studies (van Yperen et al 2015; Bracha et al. 2015) that CEOs’ fairness perceptions are affected
by their own pay. I am interested in whether CFOs’ fairness perceptions regarding their pay are
also affected by their compensation. Furthermore, based on social comparison theory,
individuals are incentivized to take action to restore fairness (Festinger 1954), and I am
interested in the ways that fairness perceptions may affect managerial behavior.
1.4.3 The effect of perceived fairness on managerial behavior
In their review of 25 years of organizational justice research, Colquitt and his colleagues (2001)
use a meta-analytic approach and find that fairness perceptions affect organizational outcomes
(e.g., job satisfaction and organizational commitment) and managerial behaviors (voluntary
withdrawal and pro-social behaviors).

Libby (2001) demonstrated how fairness perceptions affect performance in a principalagent relationship and the importance of distributive justice relative to procedural justice in an
experimental study. She finds that if the performance target is fair, the fairness of the process
used to determine the target does not affect performance. But, if the target is unfair, regardless
of the fairness of the process, performance is negatively affected. These findings support the
argument that the perception of fairness affects managerial behaviors and performance in an
agency relationship. Consistent with Libby (2001), Evans et al. (2001) find that, in contrast to
the predictions made from agency theory that focus on maximizing utility and self-interests,
subjects often sacrifice wealth in favor of honest reporting because they, as managers, believe
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reporting honestly is fair to shareholders. In their experiments, firm profits are compared under
various types of contracts where there are financial incentives to report less honestly. The
results reveal that a firm’s performance cannot be accurately predicted by economic theories
when an individual’s disposition on fairness and honesty is considered.

Besides experimental studies, some archival studies also demonstrate the non-trivial effect
of fairness perceptions on managerial behaviors. Burney et al. (2009) find that performance is
significantly enhanced if incentive contracts are linked to a strategic performance measurement
system containing characteristics that positively affect employees' justice perceptions.
Abernethy et al. (2017) and Akerlof and Kranton (2010) find consistent results that incentive
contracts alone are not sufficient to induce desirable behaviors from executives. Because
performance measures in the contracts are often imperfect indicators of managerial effort,
executives can potentially game the system. These results are also consistent with studies that
highlight the importance of fairness in organizational outcomes, for example, job performance
and work attitudes (Johnson, Selenta, and Lord 2006; Rouen 2020).
Along this line of reasoning, I argue that executive compensation affects fairness
perceptions, which, in turn, affect managerial behaviors to attempt to restore fairness, and one
of the possible means of doing so is to engage in earnings management. Abernethy et al. (2017)
reflect on this argument by stating that giving consideration to organizational justice in
executive compensation can potentially curb earnings manipulation. This is because one of the
reasons for earnings management is the perception of unfairness in compensation. Yet, whether
executives’ perceived fairness in their compensation affects the propensity to manipulate
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earnings is an empirical question. As an indirect support for my argument, Park (2019) finds
that CEOs use CEO compensation in peer firms as a benchmark to decide the level of earnings
management in the focal firms.

The impact of fairness on organizational behaviors could also be explained from an
economics perspective. The meaning of fairness in economics is different from that in
psychology. In psychology, fairness is construed as a dispositional preference, while in
economics fairness is considered to be rational and to maximize utility. For example, the
elimination of racism is fair from an economics perspective, because not only does it benefit
the minority who are discriminated against, but it also benefits society as a whole because it
enhances social stability. In a principal-agent relationship, fair treatment from employers lead
to desirable organizational behavior from employees because employees believe that
trustworthy employers will reward their performance equitably in future encounters.

Choi and Chen (2007) find a positive relationship between employees’ fairness perceptions
regarding the compensation system and their organizational commitment, because employees
trust that the firms will continually treat them fairly if the compensation system is equitably
structured. Ehlers (2020) and Gobena and Van Dijke (2017) also find that the trust induced by
fairness perceptions plays a significant role in organizational behaviors.

Collins, Mossholder, and Taylor (2012) find that, consistent with Choi and Chen (2007),
employees’ fairness perceptions regarding performance evaluation systems have a significant
impact on job performance when they plan to stay. The authors explain this relationship as
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reciprocal as employees work hard to repay the fair treatment by their employers and expect
that this will be similarly reciprocated in future interactions. Rauwolf and Bryson (2017) also
emphasized the importance of fairness in a relatively long-term relationship.
1.4.4 Perceived fairness in executive compensation and voluntary turnover

The actions managers take to restore fairness may not be limited to the manipulation of earnings.
In other words, the propensity for executives to manipulate earnings depends on the cost of
earnings management. As SOX requires managers to personally certify the legitimacy of
financial statements, executives’ ability to manipulate earnings without being detected by
auditors and shareholders has significantly declined (Cohen et al. 2008). Thus, I argue that
executives who perceive they are unfairly compensated may take alternative actions to restore
fairness other than earnings manipulation, for example voluntarily withdrawing from their
current employment.

As a proponent to Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory, Adams and Jacobson (1964)
find that subjects who face unfair conditions try to align their input/outcome ratio with that of
others in their experiments. In other words, two conditions are considered by subjects as unfair:
(1) more inputs (e.g., efforts) are expended than others; and (2) less favorable outcomes are
achieved compared to others. Thus, in order to restore fairness, individuals either enhance their
outcomes or reduce their inputs. In previous sections, earnings management is regarded as
increasing the outcome by executives who perceive they are underpaid. Voluntary turnover
could be considered as an extreme example of executives reducing their inputs.

26

This argument that fairness perceptions affect the propensity for voluntary turnover is
supported by Bloom and Michel (2002), who find that pay dispersion between CEOs and
lower-level managers is very large. Furthermore, this large pay dispersion increases the
tendency for lower-level managers to voluntarily withdraw from their current employment. The
authors find that when lower-level managers perceive the large pay gap as unfair, they consider
voluntary turnover as a viable means to restore fairness, assuming that they will be treated more
fairly in their next employment.

Some experimental studies support this conclusion. For example, Jones and Skarlicki
(2003) find that retail employees who regard their compensation as unfair are more likely to
voluntarily withdraw. Similarly, Ryan et al. (2006) find that among IT professionals, fairness
perceptions regarding their compensation affect job satisfaction, which in turn affects the
propensity for voluntary turnover. Salleh and Memon (2015) review the literature and provide
a theoretical support for the argument that perceived fairness in compensation affects job
commitment, which in turn affects the rate of voluntary turnover.

Based on the evidence above, I argue that executives who perceive they are unfairly
compensated may consider voluntary turnover as an alternative way to restore fairness,
particularly executives who have limited ability to manipulate earnings, due either to strict
internal and shareholder monitoring or to the stringent regulations brought in by SOX.
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1.5 Discussion and implications
Managerial behaviors based on agency theory may differ from, sometimes even contradict,
those based on fairness theory. For example, managers may engage in opportunistic behaviors
to increase their wealth based on agency theory. However, individuals who prefer fairness may
refrain from such behaviors. Cohen et al. (2007) find that individuals with a preference for
fairness engage in fewer opportunistic behaviors even if there are financial incentives to behave
opportunistically. Further, Stevens and Thevaranjan (2010) find that by considering moral
dispositions in a principal-agent model, some moral hazard problems may not be as severe as
agency theory predicts. In this case, including these preferences diminishes and even
invalidates the motivations for such behaviors identified by agency theory, and provides a more
nuanced understanding of why individuals engage in opportunistic behaviors.
Future empirical studies analyzing the relationship between executive compensation and
managerial behavior could benefit from considering fairness theories. By acknowledging the
effect of fairness perceptions on certain managerial behavior, the motivation for such behavior
in certain conditions could be more reliably predicted. Additionally, it is of practical
significance in terms of contract and incentive design that the magnitude of opportunistic
behavior can be more accurately measured by considering alternative mechanisms. Consistent
with the argument above, Greenberg (1990) analyzes the relationship between a pay cut and
employee behaviors and shows that only a quarter of employee theft and turnover can be
explained by a pay cut itself. Employees’ perceptions of unfairness due to the pay cut explain
the remaining three quarters. In other words, the perception of unfairness and the pay cut itself
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both lead to negative attitudes and opportunistic behaviors. If only the pay cut is considered,
but not the preference for fairness, then the firm is not able to adequately prepare for the
negative consequences arising from the pay cut.
Future studies could take advantage of fairness theories to form testable hypotheses and
gain insights on the nuances of the antecedents and consequences of organizational behaviors,
or to quantify the level of certain behaviors more accurately. Yet, researchers should be cautious
about the measurement of fairness perceptions. Has a measure incorporated sufficient
information regarding the situation agents are facing? Does the information incorporated
represent the information agents will evaluate when forming fairness perceptions? In other
words, future research calls for a multi-dimensional measurement of fairness perceptions.
Rupp et al. (2017) state that current studies considering organizational justice in a
principal-agent setting do not fully incorporate the concept of social comparison theory, which
is foundational to fairness theories (e.g., reciprocity theory and deprivation theory). I provide
below some directions for future research within the framework of social comparison theory.
Firstly, it may be fruitful to analyze how boards of directors and shareholders react to
actions engaged in by executives to restore fairness. Would they change the amount and
structure of executive compensation packages to make them fairer to executives? Or, would
they resort to mechanisms of internal and external control to discipline executives who are
inclined to engage in opportunistic behaviors? Secondly, does the passage of SOX reduce
earnings management by constraining managerial power? In other words, after SOX do
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managers with less power engage in less earnings management, since an important purpose of
SOX is to reduce the discretion managers have over financial reporting. Thirdly, fairness
perceptions are affected by some demographic characteristics. For example, Pfeifer and
Stephan (2019) find that gender roles and gender identify are responsible for the gap in fairness
perceptions between male and female survey respondents. Hence, it is natural to ask if fairness
perceptions affected by these factors also impact the tendency for executives to engage in
earnings management. Fourthly, as I mentioned in the previous section, fairness perceptions
depend significantly on the referents individuals choose. Thus, interested researchers could
explore which type of referents executives prefer to use in social comparisons, a convenient
sample (e.g., close friends) or a more scientific sample (e.g., executive compensation in similar
firms)? Lastly, executives who perceive that they are unfairly paid are certainly not constrained
to earnings management and voluntary turnover as available courses of action they might take,
so what alternatives might they choose to use to restore fairness? For example, they could
choose to retaliate against the initiators of the unfair treatments they have received, sometimes
even at the expense of some personal wealth?
The next chapter of the dissertation analyzes the relationship between earnings
management and executive compensation incorporating fairness considerations, with the
intention to explore alternative explanations for earnings management. It aims to create a
measure for fairness perceptions based on social comparison theory with multiple aspects
considered. In Chapter 3, I analyze the relationship between perceived fairness in executive
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compensation and voluntary turnover, considered to be one of the alternative actions, besides
earnings management, that executives may take to restore fairness.
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Table 1 Selected Journals based on ABDC AJG Scimago Rankings (Cont'd)
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Calculate average score for ABDC, AJG & Scimago. Assign Letter Ranks: 10 pts=A+, >7.5 pts=A

33

Table 2 Summary of Selected Research: Earnings Management and Executive Compensation
Author(s)
Baker, Collins, and
Reitenga (2009)

Methodology
Archival

Sample
S&P 1,500

Sample Period
1992-2003

Description
Examine the incentives and opportunities
for executives to manage earnings

Laux, and Laux
(2009)

Theoretical

N/A

N/A

Kalyta (2009)

Archival

Fortune 1000

1997-2006

Examine the theoretical relationship
between CEO compensation and earnings
management when board monitoring is
present
Examine the relationship between earnings
management and CEO pension plans

Grant, Markarian,
Parbonettie (2009)

Archival

S&P 1,500

1992-2005

Examine the relationship between CEOs'
risk-taking incentives and income
smoothing

Ibrahim and Lloyd
(2011)

Archival

S&P 500

1992-2004

Examine the relationship between earnings
management and non-performance-based
measures in executive compensation
packages

Conclusions
Discretionary accruals preceding option grants are
lower when option pay is higher and firm
performance is poor (incentives), and when option
grants are less frequent (opportunity)
The increase in equity compensation does not
necessarily increase the level of earnings
management when board monitoring is effective
CEO pension plans are positively related to
discretionary accruals only when these plans are
based on firm performance
The sensitivity of CEOs' option holdings to stock
prices is positively related to income smoothing
behaviors, measured by the correlation between
the change in discretionary accruals and the
change in pre-managed earnings
Firms that use both performance and nonperformance-based measures have a lower level of
discretionary accruals than firms who only use
performance-based measures in CEO
compensation packages
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Table 2 Summary of Selected Research: Earnings Management and Executive Compensation (Cont'd)
Author(s)
Veenman, Hodgson,
van Praag, and
Zhang (2011)

Methodology
Archival

Sample
Thomson
Reuters insider
filings database

Sample Period
1996-2006

Adut, Holder, and
Robin (2013)

Archival

S&P 1,500

1993-2010

Liu, Liu, and Yin
(2014)

Archival

S&P 1,500

1998-2011

Chan, Chen, Chen,
and Yu (2015)

Archival

Clawback
adopters in
Corporate
Library

2005-2009

Description
Compared to regular insider share tradings,
if the exercise of stock options provides a
higher incentive for executives to manage
earnings
Examine the association between predictive
and opportunistic earnings management and
executive compensation
Analyze if the schedule of stock options
affects managerial behavior regarding
earnings management

Analyze the effect of the adoption of
clawback provisions on earnings
management

Conclusions
The exercise of in-the-money stock options is
associated with larger income-increasing
discretionary accruals, signalling lower
informational valence and earnings quality
Predictive (Opportunistic) earnings management is
positively (negatively) associated with CEO total
compensation
Firms that grant irregular stock options have more
income-decreasing discretionary accruals than firms
that grant scheduled stock options in advance of
option grants, and this relationship is more
pronounced for firms with large option grants
The adoption of clawback provisions does not deter
earnings management but causes a shift from
accruals earnings management to real activities
management
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Table 2 Summary of Selected Research: Earnings Management and Executive Compensation (cont'd)
Author(s)

Methodology

Sample

Sample
Period
1997-2006

Hsieh, Ren, and
Lirely (2016)

Archival

Companies with
large layoffs

Li, Holmes, and
Lee (2016)

Archival

S&P 1,500

2000-2009

Francis, Hasan,
and Li (2016)

Archival

1994-2011

Park (2017)

Archival

SDC's Mergers
and Acquisitions
Database
S&P 1,500

Marinovic and
Povel (2017)

Theoretical

N/A

N/A

1994-2013

Description

Conclusions

Examine the association between accruals
management and executive compensation
around large layoffs

Because of negative stock market reactions around large
layoffs, executives with performance-based pay are
incentivized to manipulate earnings during this period

Examine the relationship between executive
compensation and earnings management
based on different levels of earnings
management and executive compensation
Analyze the pattern of real earnings
management around some significant
corporate events
Analyze the relationship between pay
disparities in the top management team and
earnings management

Confirm executive compensation as an incentive for
earnings management, and identify a non-linear
relationship between earnings management and executive
compensatioin
An increase in income-decreasing real earnings
management is found before share re-purchases,
management buy-outs, and CEO option grants
Real activities manipulation is positively related to pay
disparities between CEOs and other executives in the top
management team, and this relationship is driven by
short-term compensation
Competition for CEO talents can mitigate the inefficiency
introduced by low-powered incentives, but may induce
more severe misreporting caused by excessive highpowered incentives

Introduce competition for CEO talents and
develop a model to demonstrate the
effectiveness of incentive compensation on
deterring earnings management

36

Table 2 Summary of Selected Research: Earnings Management and Executive Compensation (cont'd)
Author(s)
Lobo, Manchiraju,
and Sridharan
(2018)

Methodology
Archival

Sample
S&P 1,500

Sample Period
1994-2013

Description
Examine if CEO pay cuts following
poor firm performance affect the level
of earnings management

Conclusions
After pay cuts, CEOs are more incentivized to engage
in earnings management to enhance reported firm
performance

Tahir, Ibrahim, and
Nurullah (2019)

Archival

FTSE 350

2005-2014

Examine if the choice of performance
measures in bonus contracts affects
CEOs' engagement in earnings
management behaviors

Shu and Thomas
(2019)

Archival

S&P 1,500

1992-2005

Examine the informational valence of
managerial equity holdings and its
relationship with earnings management

Park (2019)

Archival

S&P 1,500

1997-2014

Brink, Gouldman,
Rose, and Rotaru
(2020)

Experimental

MBA students

N/A

Examine if executives benchmark their
compensation with that in peer firms
and change their behavior regarding
earnings management accordingly
Examine the effect of executive
compensation structures on
subordinates' tendency to engage in real
activities management

Firms with performance and non-performance based
measures in CEO bonus contracts have less accruals
and real activities earnings management than firms
with performance based measures only in such
contracts
Both stock and option holdings incentivize CEOs and
CFOs to engage in earnings management, but stockinduced earnings management is to reduce information
asymmetry, while options-induced earnings
management is to mask the volatility in earnings
Executive compensation in the peer firms of similar
industries positively affects earnings management in
the focal firm
When executives are paid by unrestricted stocks
instead of restricted stocks, their subordinates focus
more on short-term firm performance by discontinuing
failing R&D projects

37

2. Is Fairness Perception Regarding Executive Compensation a Motivation for Earning
Management?
2.1 Introduction
The focus of the second chapter of my dissertation is on the empirical testing of the effect of
perceived fairness in executive compensation on earnings management by introducing a
measure for it.
The evidence in the literature is inconclusive with regard to the relationship which exists
between executive compensation and earnings management. As the use of performance-based
compensation is prevalent in executive compensation packages, some recent papers find that
executives whose compensation is tied to firm performance are incentivized to manipulate
earnings (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006). In contrast, another stream
of research finds no significant association between executive compensation and earnings
management (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2006; Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2010).
Because of this mixed evidence, I contend that there is a need for research that delves into the
specific mechanism of the relationship. In other words, the relationship between executive
compensation and earnings management may be explained by alternative theories.
In this chapter, I argue that social comparison theory helps to explain the mechanism
through which executive compensation influences earnings management. Festinger (1954)
used social comparison theory to explain the impulse for human beings to compare their
outcomes (e.g., compensation) with that of others and the incentive to reduce any discrepancy,
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if one exists. Therefore, in an organizational setting, executives who perceive they are unfairly
compensated based on social comparison are motivated to solve this inequity by some means,
for example, by engaging in income-increasing earnings management to enhance their
performance-based pay. Consistent with this argument, Park (2019) finds that executives
compare their compensation with that of executives in peer firms, then use this comparison as
the benchmark to determine the level of earnings management that will be employed in their
own firms. In this chapter, I hypothesize that executives who perceive they are unfairly
compensated manage earnings upward for the sake of fairness.
The result is consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, I find that CFOs who perceive
they are unfairly compensated manipulate earnings upward using discretionary accruals, which
is the main proxy for earnings management in this study and in the literature of earnings
management. The finding not only complements the previous results in the literature that
executive compensation is positively related to earnings management, but also emphasizes the
effect of fairness in executive compensation on opportunistic behaviors.
The contributions of this study to the literature are threefold. Firstly, the inclusion of the
perceived fairness in executive compensation sheds some light on the inconclusive relationship
between executive compensation and earnings management, more specifically on the
mechanism through which executive compensation could influence earnings management. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, this is helpful in more accurately quantifying the impact of
executive pay on earnings manipulation.
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Secondly, I provide a model that incorporates social comparison theory to measure the
perceived fairness in executive compensation. In this chapter, I regress CFO compensation on
the factors that are likely to be considered by CFOs when forming fairness perceptions and by
boards of directors when determining compensation. Then I use the residuals from the above
model to measure whether CFOs perceive themselves to be unfairly compensated. The practice
of using residuals from regressions as the proxy for the abnormal component of some economic
construct (e.g., discretionary accruals) has been widely used before. While most of the literature
on executive compensation has been focused on CEOs, this chapter analyzes CFO
compensation, arguing that CFOs have more control over the financial reporting process and
probably possess more financial expertise to be able to employ earnings management than other
executives in the management team.
Thirdly, there are implications for the board of directors when constructing compensation
packages for executives. Though, according to Faulkender and Yang (2010), around 96% of
the firms in their sample use compensation benchmarking, at least to some extent, in the firms’
proxy statements, they are critical of the fact that most firms choose peers with larger firm size
and higher executive compensation. In other words, these firms use peer benchmark as a ploy
to appease public outrage regarding excessive compensation, instead of using it to provide
fairer compensation to their executives, which is encouraged by the current study.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the literature
review and hypothesis development. Section 2.3 discusses the research design, and the results
are presented in Section 2.4. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 respectively present the results of the
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additional analyses and robustness tests conducted. In the last section, the implications and
limitations of my research and future research avenues have been delineated.
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development
There is a large stream of literature that focuses on the effect of executive compensation on
earnings management, but the evidence is inconclusive. Most papers suggest that performancebased compensation, as a determinant of accounting choices, is positively related to
opportunistic earnings management (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006;
Efendi et al. 2007). In contrast, some notable exceptions in the literature find that earnings
management is not significantly related to executive compensation (Erickson et al. 2006;
Armstrong et al. 2010).
This mixed evidence on the relationship between earnings management and executive
compensation could be explained by alternative theories (Skinner 1993). As the economic
theories cannot universally explain the findings in the literature, the consideration of alternative
theories may provide additional insights on the drivers of earnings management. I rely on social
comparison theory to provide more nuance to the relationship and complement the current state
of the literature.
Social comparison theory (Festinger 1954) proposes that agents compare their
compensation with a referent or a group of referents as a benchmark to perceive whether
principals treat them fairly (Matuszewski 2010; Miller et al. 2002). If agents perceive that they
are unfairly compensated, then job satisfaction and commitment may be hampered. For
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example, Trevor and Wazeter (2006) argue that lower-level employees’ feelings of unfairness
due to the large pay differential between them and executives cause reduced job satisfaction
and commitment. Watson et al. (1996) also argue that fairness in compensation should be
considered because it has been found that “raw” compensation is not a significant determinant
of job satisfaction.
The negatively-affected job attitude caused by the unfair treatment, coupled with the desire
to increase their compensation might incentivize executives to engage in opportunistic
behaviors that may be at odds with the interests of shareholders. Consistent with this argument,
Greenberg (1990) finds that employees’ working attitudes are negatively affected by pay cuts
perceived to be unfair. These employees, consequently, are more likely to engage in
opportunistic behaviors (e.g., theft) that are harmful to the firms than are employees who
experience the same pay cuts, but do not consider them to be unfair. Along the same line, Judge
et al. (2006) use a model of path analysis to study the relationship between job satisfaction and
counter-productive work behaviors (e.g., lateness for work, divulging confidential information
to unauthorized personnel, etc.) and find that these two constructs are negatively related.
This feeling of perceived unfairness incentivizes individuals to take actions to restore
fairness (Festinger 1954), but social comparison theory itself does not state in what specific
actions individuals would engage. I surmise that if agents perceive that they are unfairly
compensated, the direct reaction to restore fairness would be to find a way to compensate
themselves. Therefore, I argue that one of the possible avenues to restore fairness for executives
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who perceive they are unfairly treated is to manipulate earnings upward to enhance their
performance-based compensation.
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with executives who perceive they are unfairly
compensated have higher income-increasing earnings management.
In the psychology literature, fairness in pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards is not strictly
distinguished. In other words, there is no difference in the mechanism through which fairness
theory explains the actions of individuals with pecuniary or non-pecuniary rewards. In this
study, I focus on fairness in the financial aspects of executive compensation, not only because
monetary rewards are often used as the outcome to form the perception of fairness, but also
because financial reward is a vital component in executive compensation and plays a far from
trivial role in empirical research on executive compensation (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1988).
Despite the proposed effect of perceived fairness on executives’ opportunistic behaviors,
there are arguments to the contrary. Firstly, executives who perceive they are unfairly treated
may simply choose alternative techniques besides earnings management as the avenue to
compensate themselves and restore fairness. As Greenberg (1990) and Judge et al. (2006)
suggest, theft, voluntary turnover, and other counter-productive organizational behaviors may
also be used as viable methods.
However, I choose earnings management in the current study not only because it is a welldeveloped construct and empirically measurable, but also because it is a hard-to-detect means
of manipulating reported earnings (Jones 1991). As the use of stock options and restricted stock
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units in executive compensation packages has soared in recent years, it is reasonable to argue
that tacit earnings manipulation to inflate firms’ market performance is an astute choice
whereby executives who experience unfair treatments may remunerate themselves as this
technique cannot be easily detected by the market.
Another counter argument is that the purpose of earnings management may not be to
restore fairness for executives with unfair perceptions. More specifically, the level of earnings
management is possibly chosen solely due to firms’ operational conditions; therefore, it is not
related to fairness considerations. Though earnings management is normally regarded as
opportunistic in the literature, it may possibly reflect firms’ fundamental conditions. In other
words, managers may use their discretion and the flexibility in GAAP to convey private
information about their firms’ operation to outsiders. Thus, the informational valence of
earnings management cannot be fully ruled out (Adut et al. 2013).
For example, Badertscher et al. (2012) compare the informativeness of previously reported
earnings with that of restated earnings. They conduct this analysis separately for firms that
manipulate earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts 7 and firms that do not manipulate
earnings. Consistent with Adut and colleagues’ notion of predictive earnings management, they
find that the informativeness of reported earnings is stronger than that of restated earnings when
earnings manipulation is employed to indicate future performance8.

7

Meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts is a commonly used proxy for earnings manipulation.

For example, if managers believe in the next period firm performance will be significantly improved, they may manage
earnings upward in this period to imply this information to outsiders.
8
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In contrast to Badertscher et al. (2012), earnings management in the current study is solely
considered as opportunistic. More specifically, in this setting, executives use earnings
management to restore fairness for the sake of their personal wealth, not for any strategic
purpose in terms of the firm, such as to reduce information asymmetry between executives and
outsiders.
Thirdly, earnings management may not be related to the concept of fairness because
executives may engage in earnings management simply to increase their compensation. In other
words, it is perhaps the case that even without fairness considerations, executives still have the
incentive to increase their compensation by manipulating earnings, and this is consistent with
agency theory on utility maximization. As mentioned previously in Chapter 1, the relationship
between earnings management and executive compensation without consideration of fairness
theories is well-documented in the literature.
Also, I cannot rule out the possibility that on one hand, some abnormally highly paid
executives still engage in earnings management for even higher compensation; on the other
hand, some abnormally lowly paid executives may engage in earnings management without
consideration of fairness.
In the current study, in order to mitigate the confounding effect of raw executive
compensation as mentioned above, I measure perceived fairness in executive compensation
and analyze the effect of this measure on the level of earnings management. In other words, I
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identify conditions in which fairness considerations are more salient than pure self-interest in
maximizing personal wealth.
Despite all the counter arguments above, I still believe the hypothesis holds because the
perception of fairness plays an important role in organizational settings and it should have an
impact on managerial behaviors. As argued by Abernethy et al. (2017), it has been recognized
in the literature that the perception of fairness can be an instrument in motivating managerial
behaviors. Also, Cohen et al. (2007) state that the nature of agency relationship can be further
understood by considering context-specific factors, such as the perception of fairness.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, distributive justice focuses on the justice of the outcome, while
procedural justice focuses on the justice of the procedure that leads to the outcome.
In this dissertation I focus on distributive justice rather

than

procedural justice

for

the

following reasons.
Firstly, it has been argued in the literature that distributive justice is more important than
procedural justice. For example, McFarlin and Sweeney (1992) and Libby (1991) state that
distributive justice is a more important predictor of personal perceptions and behaviors than
procedural justice. Secondly, the use of distributive justice is consistent with the main
hypothesis in this chapter, which is that executives who perceive they are unfairly paid are
dissatisfied with the outcome and are likely to take actions to restore fairness. In other words,
the focus is on the perception of fairness derived from the outcome, instead of on the procedures
used by the board of directors to determine the outcome. Thirdly, to analyze the effect of
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executive compensation on managerial behaviors, distributive justice is more appropriate than
procedural justice. Distributive justice has been found to have stronger effects on fairness
perceptions when the outcome of interest is individually based (Tyler 1994; Hauenstein et al.
2001). Executive compensation is determined based on individual characteristics, such as
tenure and expertise, thus fairness perceptions of executive compensation should be strongly
affected by distributive justice.
2.3 Research Methodology
In this study, I add a relatively new dimension of executive compensation, which is the
perceived fairness in compensation, to complement the extant literature on the relationship
between executive compensation and earnings management. More specifically, I analyze the
association between the perception of fairness in CFO compensation and discretionary accruals.
In the sections below, I provide reasons why CFOs are chosen as the research subject and
describe the model I use for estimating CFOs’ perception of fairness. Then I use discretionary
accruals as my main proxy of earnings management and provide a rationale for this choice.
Lastly, I present the model used to test the main hypothesis and provide the rationale for the
choice of each independent variable.
2.3.1 CFOs chosen as research subjects
I use CFOs as the research subject for the following reasons. Firstly, I argue that CFOs who
perceive themselves to be treated unfairly feel more incentive to take action for the sake of
fairness. Cropanzano and Folger (1989) argued that employees’ desire to restore fairness is not
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only a function of their justice perceptions, but also of the opportunity to blame the unfair
treatment on others’ actions, instead of on their own behavior. In line with this reasoning, CFOs
could blame their direct superiors (i.e., CEOs) for the perceived inequitable treatment they
receive. Yet as CEOs are at the top of the managerial hierarchy, they are less likely than CFOs
to blame others for unfair treatment they receive.
Secondly, CFOs are more directly in charge of financial reporting: approving or
disapproving decisions leading to earnings management. Consistent with this, Beaudoin and
Cianci (2005) argue that CFOs act as the gatekeeper to firms’ financial reporting as they are
responsible for the “tone at the top” that helps shape organizational culture towards the
prevention of opportunistic behaviors and the improvement of business ethics. The importance
of CFOs’ actions regarding financial reporting, more specifically on earnings management, is
reinforced by Graham et al. (2005). Graham et al. (2005) surveyed more than 400 incumbent
CFOs and interviewed 20 CFOs to determine the antecedents of earnings management. The
authors find that executives holding CFO-like titles (i.e., CFO, treasurer, controller, vice
president, etc.) have control over financial reporting. They also find that CFOs indeed
manipulate earnings to enhance their personal wealth.
Thirdly, I argue that CFOs have the financial expertise required to engage in earnings
management in the first place. Aier et al. (2005) argue that due to increased complexity in the
financial statements and heightened scrutiny from regulators and auditors after the passage of
SOX, CFOs’ accounting background plays an even more important role in the quality of
financial reporting. As a result of these factors, I argue that using CFOs as the research subject
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can provide valuable insights about the effect of executives’ perceptions of fairness on their
sub-optimal behaviors.
Additionally, in the literature of executive compensation, CEO compensation is more
commonly used than that of CFOs due to CEOs’ significance in the operation of firms. However,
due to their important role and significant managerial power over the board of directors, it is
argued that CEOs may practically set their own pay (Pollock, Fischer, and Wade 2002). Thus,
I argue that CEOs are less likely to experience the feeling of unfairness in compensation than
CFOs. Even if they perceive they are unfairly compensated, they may have other means to
restore fairness by exerting their power on compensation committee members instead of using
earnings management. In contrast, CFOs who perceive they are unfairly compensated may be
more inclined to resort to earnings manipulation.
2.3.2 The perception of fairness in CFO compensation
I estimate the perceived fairness in CFO compensation as the residuals from a predictive model
that predicts CFO compensation based on particular factors. The model specification and
variable definitions are provided below.
OLS standard errors are unbiased when the residuals are independent and identically
distributed (i.e., i.i.d.). However, in a panel dataset, it is highly likely that there are multiple
observations on the same firm for the sample period, and the residuals of a given firm may be
correlated across time. Petersen (2009) confirms this and calls it ‘time-series dependence’ or
‘unobserved firm effect’. Thus, following the suggested practice in Peterson (2009), the error
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terms are firm-clustered to mitigate the problem of repeated observations from the same firm
during the sample period for panel data and to control for heteroskedasticity.
The residuals from the model form my measure of CFO relative pay, which is the proxy
for fairness perceptions in this study. If the residuals are negative, then CFOs’ actual
compensation is below the benchmark identified by the predictive model and vice versa. The
residuals are then multiplied by (-1) in that a larger value indicates that the focal CFO is more
unfairly compensated. My empirical model is specified in the following equation (Equation 1)
in which all the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of
outliers and possible data errors and ordinary least square (OLS) estimation method is
employed:
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +

𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽10 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛴𝛽𝑚 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑚 + 𝛴𝛽𝑛 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

I use the natural logarithm of CFOs’ total direct compensation as the dependent variable
(CFOComp). Total direct compensation includes salary and bonus, as well as option grants and
restricted stocks. As for the independent variables, FirmSize, which is proxied by the natural
logarithm of total assets at the end of the period, is controlled. Firms’ financial and market
performance are also controlled. I use return on assets (ROA) and annualized stock returns as
the proxies for financial performance (FirmFinPerf) and market performance (FirmMktPerf),
respectively. ROA is calculated as net income before extraordinary items over total assets at
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the beginning of the period. Annualized stock return is calculated as the product of one plus
monthly holding returns for twelve months, then minus one9. Stockvolatility measures the risks
in stocks, which is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the fiscal
year. Financial leverage (Leverage) measures firms’ operational risks, which is calculated as
total debts over total assets at the end of the period. Firms’ growth opportunity (Growth) is
proxied by market-to-book ratio (MTB), which is calculated as market value of equity over
book value of equity at the end of the period.
CFOs’ age (CFOAGE) is also controlled. The variable for CFOs who are approaching
retirement is defined as an indicator variable, which equals one when their age is above 64, and
zero otherwise.
CFO tenure is defined as a continuous variable that equals the number of years with the
firm. There are a significant number of missing values for the date of joining the firm and the
date of leaving the firm, to the extent that the sample size, and thus also the power of the tests,
is significantly reduced. It is reasonable to assume that CFOs with missing values on the date
of leaving the firm are still with the firm in the respective fiscal year. I thus replace the missing
values with the corresponding fiscal year. Further, I replace the missing values for the date of
joining the firm with the start year of the sample period (i.e., the year of 2006). Then the
difference between the leaving date and the joining date is defined as CFO tenure. Lastly, I
replace the observations with zero and negative values to one. In other words, for my sample,

9

Annualized stock returns=(1+R1)(1+R2)…(1+R12)-1 where Rm is the monthly holding returns.
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the CFOs have at least one year of tenure with the firm. This treatment is consistent with the
literature (e.g., Chen and Zheng, 2014).
CFO gender is an indicator variable that equals one for male CFOs and zero for female
CFOs. CFO board membership is an indicator variable that equals one if the CFO serves on
the board, and zero otherwise. I use the log ratio between CFO compensation and CEO
compensation to proxy for the relative power difference between CFOs and CEOs. Lastly, year
and industry dummies are included. Fama-French 48-industry categorization (Fama and French
1997) is employed. In the next section, the justifications for the dependent and independent
variables are provided.
The choice of total compensation as the dependent variable is consistent with O’Reilly III
and Main (2010). The inclusion of restricted stocks is based on Bebchuk and Fried (2005)’s
claim that boards are increasingly moving away from stock grants and toward the use of
restricted stocks. By using total compensation, I assume that when forming fairness perceptions,
CFOs in my sample consider every component in their compensation package, but I cannot
claim that CFOs value the fairness in the different components of their compensation packages
equally.
I argue that the capability of the model to measure perceived fairness depends on two
criteria. Firstly, these independent variables should be likely considered by boards of directors
when determining executive compensation. This is a common criterion that needs to be
satisfied for the determinants of executive compensation in the literature without considering
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fairness. Secondly, these variables should also be considered by CFOs when forming fairness
perceptions. Goodman (1974) argued that contextual factors (e.g., firm characteristics and
CFOs’ demographic information) are likely to be considered when the perception of fairness is
formed. Based on these two criteria, I classify the variables that I use to estimate CFOs’ fairness
perceptions regarding their own compensation into three categories: the firms’ operating
environments, CFOs’ demographic characteristics, and the firms’ corporate governance
environments. Below I will delineate the rationale for including each variable in the model.
Specifically, the reasons for which CFOs would consider these factors when forming fairness
perceptions will be provided.
In the first category, the variables related to the firms’ operating environments are included.
When forming fairness perceptions, it is reasonable to assume that CFOs are likely to consider
the factors regarding their work environment. These variables include firm size, firm
performance, stock returns and volatility, firm leverage, and market-to-book ratio.
Gabaix and Landier (2008) find that executive compensation is positively related to firm
size. When forming fairness perceptions about compensation, I argue that CFOs in larger firms
would perceive that they should be rewarded more due to the complexity of organizational
structure, possibly with more employees and geographically diversified locations to administer.
Faulkender and Yang (2010) find that besides firm size, financial and market performance
are related to executive compensation, because incentive pay is often linked to a firm’s
performance. I argue that CFOs in firms with better financial and market performance would
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expect greater compensation, because they would perceive that they should be compensated at
a premium for the efforts exerted to increase firm performance.
Stock volatility is controlled for on the basis that stocks with highly volatile performance
are of higher risk. Investors value stocks with predictable performance, thus the board of
directors would reward executives who are able to reduce fluctuations in stock performance.
This argument predicts a negative relationship between stock volatility and executive
compensation. However, the relationship could be positive if fairness is considered. Executives
with performance-based pay in a firm of highly volatile stock performance may require a
premium on their reimbursement to compensate for the risks on their stock grants and restricted
stocks.
The expectations based on economic or fairness considerations also produce opposite
predictions regarding financial leverage. Financial leverage measures bankruptcy risk and costs
of debt, which reflect managerial competence in firms’ sustainability. Firms with higher
leverage are also more likely to be scrutinized by creditors. Thus, executives in highly
leveraged firms are less likely to be paid excessively. Yet, similar to the reasoning regarding
stock volatility, firms with higher leverage are riskier, thus executives may require a premium
on their compensation in highly leveraged firms.
Market-to-book ratio measures growth opportunities and firms’ stage of development, thus
firms with higher MTB ratio are regarded as having higher potential. Executives in these firms
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are regarded as more competent by the market and rewarded more. Executives who attribute
this high MTB ratio to their efforts would consider a bigger reward as fair.
The second category is the variables related to CFOs’ demographic characteristics,
including CFOs’ age, decision horizon, tenure, and gender. Watson et al. (1996) find a positive
relationship between executives’ age and their compensation. CFOs with greater age may
perceive they should be compensated more, as, to some extent, age is positively related to jobrelated experience, financial expertise, and tenure in the industry.
The amount and structure of executive compensation may be affected by the executive’s
decision horizon. More specifically, executives approaching retirement may be more risk
averse in that they may refrain from engaging in projects that take time to show profit. The
board of directors, acknowledging this tendency, would change the compensation packages
accordingly so as to induce executives with a short decision-horizon to invest in the long term
(Narayanan 1996).
Tenure with a firm may represent specific knowledge about the firm. Thus, executives with
longer tenure should be rewarded more if they can use this knowledge to enhance the firm’s
value. Yet, Zheng (2010) finds that inside CEOs, who presumably have longer tenure with the
firm than outside CEOs, have reduced equity-based compensation in their later years of tenure
with the intent of reducing incentives for them to engage in opportunistic behaviors (e.g.,
empire building).
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With regard to gender, the literature generally deems female executives to receive less
compensation than their male counterparts (e.g., Adams et al. 2007). However, Leszczynska
and Chandon (2019) do not find a direct effect of gender on executive compensation. They
attribute this discrepancy to the smaller sample size for female executives, hence the tests may
not be sufficient in some areas of research.
The third category of variables are related to the corporate governance environment.
Executives who also serve on the board are regarded as more powerful, and more powerful
executives may have more leeway in terms of their compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2004).
In other words, there is a positive relationship between board membership and executive
compensation. Besides this managerial power perspective, executives who also serve on the
board may expect greater compensation because they employ additional effort in fulfilling the
responsibilities of both roles.
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation depends on bargaining
power rather than on firm performance. In other words, managerial power significantly affects
the compensation executives receive. Along with this managerial power perspective, the
relative power between CFOs and CEOs in the same firm may also affect CFO compensation.
Friedman (2014) finds consistent results that the managerial power of CEOs over CFOs in the
same firm has implications for the compensation of CFOs and the reporting quality of the firm.
Lastly, I use year and industry dummies to control for macro-economic and industrial
trends respectively in CFO compensation.
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The underlying assumption in this study is that though perceptions may deviate from
reality at times, CFOs’ fairness perceptions are based on reality. More specifically, I assume
that CFOs are sufficiently rational as to arrive at their conclusion about fairness in their
compensation by considering and comparing contextual factors. This is not a totally arbitrary
perception but does inherently have some degree of subjectivity.
2.3.3 Discretionary accruals as the main proxy for earnings management
The reasons that I use discretionary accruals as the main proxy for earnings management
in this study are threefold. Firstly, accruals management is a hard-to-detect means of
manipulating reported earnings (Jones 1991). Thus, accruals manipulation is likely to be a
viable avenue for executives to manage earnings. The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling
1976) argues that management is more likely to engage in opportunistic behaviors when these
behaviors cannot easily be detected by shareholders and the board of directors. Accruals
management satisfies this criterion.
The second reason that I use accruals management is related to the costs of other techniques
for earnings management. As mentioned in the previous chapter, real activities manipulation
(RAM) has gained popularity recently. RAM is the technique of achieving certain earnings
targets by manipulating real transactions, for example, reducing discretionary expenditures,
postponing projects with positive net present value, and reducing costs of goods sold by overproducing inventory.
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Different from accruals-based earnings management (AEM), RAM not only has an impact
on earnings, but also has a direct impact on cash flows. For example, reductions in R&D
expenditures may reduce cash outflows thus increasing earnings in the current period, but it
may also reduce future cash inflows due to staggered product innovation. Thus, the costs of
RAM are unpredictable and could be potentially higher than that of AEM, and I argue because
of this, executives may refrain from engaging in RAM.
Consistent with the argument that the costs of RAM could be significant, Bhojraj et al.
(2009) find that firms engaging in RAM to achieve certain earnings targets experience worse
financial and market performance in the ensuing three years than firms who miss earnings
targets without earnings management. Additionally, it is recognized in the literature that
institutional investors exert significant efforts in reducing RAM due to its potentially large
costs (Roychowdhury 2006; Bushee 1998).
The third reason for using accruals management is related to the flexibility of AEM. RAM
can only be conducted during the fiscal year, and the realized portion of RAM cannot be fully
foreseen before the fiscal year-end. AEM, on the other hand, can be conducted both during the
fiscal year and after the fiscal year-end. As executive compensation is normally finalized at the
fiscal year-end when the uncertainty in firm performance for the fiscal year is low, the
perception of fairness in compensation is likely to be formed in that same timeframe. Thus,
AEM is the more appropriate strategy for executives to restore fairness. Additionally, I argue
that executives who perceive they are unfairly compensated are more likely to choose a course
of action that has controllable results, which guarantees that their compensation will be
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positively affected. Since the nature of AEM permits the results of AEM to be fully controlled,
executives are more likely to use it than less controllable methods.

I use the performance-adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005) to estimate discretionary
accruals (Equation 2), which is widely recognized in the literature of earnings management:
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 /𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 1/𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 )/𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 /𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
where total accruals (TA) are defined as total current accruals less depreciation and
amortization. Total current accruals are defined as the change in total current assets less the
change in total current liabilities less the change in cash and short-term investments plus the
change in debt in current liabilities. 𝛥REV is the change in sales; 𝛥REC is the change in
accounts receivables; PPE is the gross property, plant and equipment; ROA is defined as above.
All the variables are scaled by total assets (AT) at the beginning of the period.

The rationale for using the above model (i.e., Equation 2) to estimate discretionary accruals
is as follows. Firstly, total accruals can be directly calculated from financial statements without
ambiguity. To obtain discretionary accruals, non-discretionary accruals need first to be
estimated. Secondly, non-discretionary accruals, which are defined as the accounting accruals
that cannot be manipulated by managers, are related to accounts receivables and depreciable
long-term assets. Thus, by estimating the coefficients in Equation 2, the estimation of nondiscretionary accruals, which is on the right-hand side of the regression, can also be calculated
using items in financial statements. Thirdly, the residuals, which are the difference between
total accruals and the estimation of non-discretionary accruals, are discretionary accruals,
59

which can be manipulated by managers due to the flexibility afforded by GAAP.

There are two augmentations in Kothari et al.’s (2005) model that I also employ in this
dissertation. Firstly, the model includes firm performance, which is proxied by ROA, as firm
performance is closely related to total accruals. For example, a prospering firm performance at
the end of the year may be due to relaxed credit policies, thus the accruals regarding accounts
receivable, as well as total accruals, increase. Secondly, the model includes an intercept to
mitigate the potentially omitted size variable (Kothari et al. 2005). According to Kothari et al.
(2005), the dependent and independent variables (except for ROA) are scaled by total assets at
the beginning of the period to mitigate the problem caused by heteroskedasticity in residuals.

The coefficients are estimated by running Equation 2 in each industry and year
combination and OLS estimation method is employed. In other words, due to the similarity in
firms of the same industry and time-period, it assumes that the coefficients are also identical.
Within each industry and year combination, at least ten observations are required. The residuals
are the measure of discretionary accruals used in the main analyses. I use signed discretionary
accruals because I believe this is more in line with my hypothesis that distinguishes incomeincreasing and income-decreasing earnings management. In other words, in order to restore
fairness, CFOs who perceive they are unfairly compensated may employ less incomedecreasing discretionary accruals or more income-increasing discretionary accruals.

2.3.4 The effect of fairness in CFO compensation on earnings management

After the perceived fairness in CFO compensation and discretionary accruals are estimated, the
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next step of the analysis will be to test the main hypothesis in this study, which is the effect of
the perceived fairness in CFO compensation on earnings management. The model (Equation 3)
is provided below:
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +

𝛽1 𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽11 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛴𝛽𝑚 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑚 + 𝛴𝛽𝑛 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

where DA is the discretionary accruals estimated in Eq.2. UNDERPAID is defined before as a
continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by (-1). Then a higher value
of this variable indicates that the focal CFO is more unfairly compensated. StockHold is the
natural logarithm of CFOs’ stock holdings at the end of the period, which include stock and
option grants during the period, the estimated value of unexercised in-the-money options and
exercised options during the period. Loss is an indicator variable that equals one if net earnings
before extraordinary items in the previous period is negative, and zero otherwise. Auditor
quality (Big4) is proxied by an indicator variable that equals one if one of the largest four
auditor firms (i.e., Ernst & Young; Deloitte & Touche; KPMG; PricewaterhouseCoopers) is
employed by the firm, and zero otherwise. OLS estimation method is employed for this model.

According to Chen et al. (2010), external financing need (Capital_needs) is measured as
the difference between actual asset growth rate and sustainable asset growth rate. The actual
asset growth rate is the ratio of total assets at the end of the period over total assets at the
beginning of the period. The sustainable asset growth rate is measured as return on equity (ROE)
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over (1-ROE). ROE is calculated as the ratio between net income before extraordinary items
and book value of equity. If the difference is positive, which means the sustainable asset growth
rate cannot support a more rapid actual asset growth rate, then the firm is in need of external
financing. An indicator variable is coded as one if the firm needs external financing, and zero
otherwise. Analysts’ following (Analysts) is defined as a variable with integer values indicating
how many financial analysts are following the firm in each year. All other variables are defined
as before. The definitions of all the main variables can be found in the Appendix on page 141.

The perceived fairness in CFO compensation (UNDERPAID) is the independent variable
of interest. I expect that the coefficient on UNDERPAID is significantly positive, which means
that firms with CFOs who perceive they are more unfairly compensated have higher incomeincreasing discretionary accruals, possibly to artificially boost firm performance and increase
their compensation.

In terms of control variables, I follow the recent literature on the determinants of earnings
management (e.g., Zang 2012; Waweru and Riro 2013; Edi and Jessica 2020) and control for
factors related to equity holdings, firm fundamentals, auditor quality, capital needs, analysts’
following, and corporate governance. More specifically, I include CFOs’ stock holdings
because some studies find that there is a positive relationship between performance-based
compensation and earnings management (Burns and Kedia 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon
2006; Beaudoin and Cianci 2015). The same as in Eq.1, firms’ growth opportunity is proxied
by the market-to-book ratio. Firms with higher MTB, which reflects higher market expectations,
have less need to manipulate earnings. Firm size is negatively related to discretionary accruals
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because larger firms tend to be more stable and have fewer opportunities to manipulate earnings
than smaller firms due to closer scrutiny from shareholders and financial analysts. Due to
restrictions in debt covenants, firms of high leverage may be restricted from having high
accruals. Firms with better financial and market performance have less need to manipulate
earnings, and thus have lower discretionary accruals. Firms with negative earnings in the
previous period are more likely to manage earnings upward in the current period to avoid severe
market reactions due to consecutive negative earnings.

Some studies (e.g., Elshafie and Nyadroh 2014) find that auditor quality is negatively
related to earnings management proxied by discretionary accruals. Firms with more significant
financial needs have incentives to manage incomes upward to positively affect investors’
expectations regarding earnings potential. A larger number of financial analysts following a
firm indicates that the firm is under stricter scrutiny, which may refrain managers from
engaging in accruals management (Irani and Oesch 2016).
Executives with board membership are more powerful within their firms (Yang et al. 2018),
thus the effectiveness of board monitoring may be weakened. This weakened monitoring may
lead executives to pursue their personal wealth at the expense of shareholder interests. Bouaziz
et al. (2020) find consistent results that CEO board membership is positively related to earnings
management. Nevertheless, Xie et al. (2003) find that board membership is not significantly
related to discretionary accruals. The reasons are either executives move away from accruals
management towards real earnings management, or more powerful executives choose other
means to enhance their personal wealth instead of earnings management. Yang and Zhao (2014)
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argue that executives with board membership can more effectively execute decisions that
benefit their firms because they can effectively transform their private knowledge about their
firms as managers to make more timely decisions.
The relative power between CEOs and CFOs may also affect the level of earnings
management in which CFOs engage. Dikolli et al. (2020) find that CFOs’ organizational
behaviors are significantly affected by CEOs. More specifically, if CEOs are powerful and
ethical, CFOs in the same firms would engage in less earnings management, and vice versa.

I use year dummies to control for macro-economic trend in earnings management and
industry dummies for industrial trends. Standard errors are clustered by firms to mitigate
heteroskedasticity and repeated observations from the same firm in time-series datasets.

Some control variables in Eq. 2 are related to optimal contracting theory and corporate
governance. As stated in Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2001), executive compensation
packages are used by boards of directors to elicit desirable behaviors from managers, thus
minimizing agency costs arising from information asymmetry between principals and agents
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). In principle, an optimal compensation package should balance
the risk-seeking preferences of executives with their firm’s operating environment. The
operating environment includes financial risks (e.g., costs of debt, bankruptcy risks, and stock
volatility), thus financial leverage and stock volatility are controlled in the model. Additionally,
this package should also include a component that incentivizes executives to take risky but
profitable projects, thus the performance-based compensation (i.e., stock holdings) is also
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included. As for corporate governance, I control for CFO duality and the relative managerial
power between CFOs and CEOs in the same firm. CFOs who also serve on the board may be
problematic in that they may have excessive control over their own compensation. CFOs’
behaviors are significantly affected by CEOs in the same firm (Dikolli et al. 2020), thus the
relative power proxied by relative compensation between CFOs and CEOs is controlled.

Some factors that may have a significant impact on executive compensation, for example,
firms’ geographic locations and operating cycles, costs of living and tax rates executives face,
and corporate governance, have not been controlled to maintain some degree of parsimony.
The variables included in the model may proxy for some of the omitted variables. For example,
to some extent the impact of firms’ operating cycles could be captured by market-to-book ratio,
as start-up firms normally have a higher ratio, while firms in more stable stages have a lower
ratio. Yet, if any of the other factors significantly affects executive compensation and is
considered by executives when forming fairness perceptions, the coefficients of this model may
be biased. In this case, the results of the study should be interpreted with caution. Future studies
can examine the impact of these omitted variables on the dependent variable. However, there
is no reason to believe that these potentially omitted variables would be correlated with
earnings management. For example, executive compensation may be related to their costs of
living as highly compensated executives may enjoy a more luxurious life, but a direct
relationship between costs of living and earnings management could hardly be demonstrated.
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2.4 Sample selection, descriptive statistics, and empirical results

2.4.1 Sample selection procedures
The sample is obtained from Compustat and Execucomp 10 . The variables related to firm
characteristics are retrieved from Compustat, the variables related to executive compensation
and characteristics are retrieved from Execucomp, while the variables on stock characteristics
are retrieved from Compustat-Security Monthly.
The sample starts with 110,908 firm-year observations in Compustat between the years
2006 and 202011. After merging with Compustat-Security Monthly database and eliminating
incomplete observations, the sample drops to 89,644 firm-years. Then the combined dataset is
merged with Execucomp, and the sample size drops further to 19,998 firm-years. Consistent
with the treatment commonly used in the literature, after the merge, I drop firms in utility and
financial service industries as these firms use a different method to calculate accruals.
Executives are defined as CFOs if “CFOANN=CFO” in Execucomp. To obtain the
measurement for the perceived fairness in CFO compensation, I require each executive-year to
have non-missing values for the variables in Equation 1, thus the sample size is 10,165
executive-years with 3,760 unique executives.

10

Standard and Poor’s 1500 companies (S&P 1,500) are included in Compustat and Execucomp and are used in the thesis.

The year of 2006 is the first year in that CFO compensation is publicly available, and the year of 2020 is the most recent
year at the time of writing.
11
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To test the main hypothesis, I further merge the current dataset with Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and require each firm-year have non-missing values for the
variables in Equation 3. Due to this data restriction, the sample contains 8,477 firm-years.
2.4.2 Perceived fairness in CFO compensation
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in Equation 1. From the table, we
can see that all the variables are within the plausible range and are consistent with studies that
use similar variables in their models. For example, in Dikolli et al. (2020), the mean and median
ROA are 4.9% and 5.7%, while in my study these are 4.9% and 4.8%, respectively. The mean
and median annualized stock returns are 16.0% and 10.0% in their study, in my study these are
13.3% and 10.2%, respectively.
In my sample, there are 220 firm-years with a CFO who is 65 years old or older. There are
1,022 firm-years with a female CFO, which represent 10.05% of the sample. Additionally, there
are 1,178 firm-years that the CFO also serves on the board, which represent 11.59% of the
sample.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
The Pearson correlational matrix is shown in Table 4. First, we can see that in the first
column, all the independent variables (IVs) are significantly related to the dependent variable
(DV) at 1%, except for gender that has a significant correlation with DV at 10%. The direction
of the relationship between IVs and DV is largely consistent with my expectation. While the
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direction of the relationship between stock volatility and compensation is more consistent with
the argument based on agency theory, the direction of the relationship between financial
leverage and compensation is more consistent with the argument based on fairness theory. Next,
I tabulate the results of Eq.1 that measures the perceived fairness in CFO compensation.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Table 5 shows the results for Equation 1. The F-statistic of the model is 65.23, which is
significant at 1%, and the R-squared is 0.6072, which means that the model with the
independent variables fits the data significantly better than the intercept-only model, and the
combination of independent variables explain 60.72% of the variance in the dependent variable
(i.e., CFO compensation).
The signs of the coefficients are generally in line with my expectations. Consistent with
previous findings (Gabaix and Landier 2008; Faulkender and Yang 2010), CFOs in larger and
better performing firms tend to be compensated higher. Consistent with the argument that CFOs
require a premium on compensation for firms with higher stock risks, stock volatility has a
positive but insignificant relationship with CFO compensation. Because firms under financial
constraints are less likely to compensate their executives excessively, the coefficient on
financial leverage is negatively significant. MTB and CFO age also have consistent coefficients
that are highly significant.
CFOs approaching retirement are compensated less, which is at odds with my expectation.
Yet, the cut-off point of 65 years old may affect the direction and significance of the relationship.
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More specifically, many responsibilities, except for the title, may have already been transferred
to their successors at this age, thus CFOs are compensated less. Consistent with Zheng (2010),
the tenure with the firm is negatively related to executive compensation. Though insignificantly,
male CFOs are compensated higher than their female counterparts, compatible with the general
wisdom in the literature. Also in accord with my expectation, CFOs who also serve on the
board and CFOs with higher managerial power relative to CEOs command a higher
compensation.
Stock volatility is unrelated to executive compensation in this study. This is consistent with
my prior expectation. On one hand, as shareholders value predictable stock performance,
executives are rewarded for reduced fluctuations in stock performance; on the other hand, it is
also reasonable to expect that executives in firms of highly volatile stock performance require
a premium on their compensation to offset the risks. As there is no overwhelming evidence
suggesting one view is more plausible than the other, a directional relationship between stock
volatility and executive compensation is not expected.
The counterintuitively negative relationship between CFO tenure and CFO compensation
is possibly due to measurement errors in CFO tenure. As mentioned in the section of variable
definitions on page 50, because of a significant amount of missing values for the dates of CFOs
joining and leaving firms, I have had to make some assumptions in constructing this variable,
but severe measurement errors may also occur. Additionally, the coefficient may be biased
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because of multicollinearity between CFO tenure, CFO age, and CFOs’ decision horizon, as
the three variables are significantly correlated at 1%12.
Lastly, the coefficients for all the year dummies, except for 2008,13 and all the industry
dummies, except for Automobiles & Trucks and Precious Metals, are significant (untabulated),
which justifies the use of year and industry dummies to control for possible trends in macroeconomic conditions. The variance inflation factor (VIF) shows that multicollinearity is not
likely to be a problem for my model as the largest VIF is for financial leverage, which is 2.4814.
This measurement of perceived fairness is subject to several limitations. Firstly, the
underlying assumption is that executives are sufficiently rational in that they form fairness
perceptions based on their work environment and demographic characteristics (Goodman
1974), instead of solely based on previous work experience or the compensation of their friends.
Secondly, the model fails to capture all the possible factors that potentially affect executive
compensation and are likely to be considered by executives when forming fairness perceptions.
If any of these omitted variables has a significant impact, then this proxy for perceived fairness
may have a severe measurement error. Thirdly, the model assumes that fairness perceptions
regarding executive compensation are to some extent static. In other words, I assume that
executives form their fairness perceptions regarding their pay around fiscal year end after they

12

As an additional test, I run the same model with only one of the three variables. CFO tenure becomes insignificant, CFO
age is still significantly positive at 1%, while CFO’s decision horizon is significantly negative at 5%.
13

The insignificance of the year dummy for 2008 is presumably due to the impact of the financial crisis.

14

Normally, a VIF less than 5 is considered to be without multicollinearity issues.
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have a relatively clear prospect of how much they will earn for the period, but this model fails
to capture scenarios in which executives form fairness perceptions during the fiscal year.
2.4.3 Validation of the measure for perceived fairness
The validity of the test on the main hypothesis, which is the relationship between perceived
fairness in executive compensation and earnings management, largely depends on the ability
of the measure to capture the underlying construct.
Based on social comparison theory, in a principal-agent setting, the perceived fairness is
largely determined by the choice of peers. In the proxy statements, around 96% of the firms’
board of directors use peers, which are based on firm size and industry categorization, to
benchmark the compensation of their top executives (Faulkender and Yang 2010). Though
when forming fairness perceptions regarding their own pay, executives may not necessarily
employ the information used by the board of directors, I argue that this type of information
represents at least a starting point for executives to evaluate whether they are fairly
compensated. Consistent with the argument above, Cooper et al. (2016) use relative executive
compensation based on industry and size groups to test the extent to which executive
compensation incentivizes managerial behavior in promoting firm performance.
I then use Cooper et al. (2016)’s method to estimate the fairness in CFO compensation and
compare with the results using my model. Within the same industry and year, I match a firm
with another firm in the same decile of total assets. Then I use the difference between CFO
compensation of the focal firm and that of the matched firm to decide if the focal firm’s CFO
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is unfairly compensated. More specifically, if the difference is negative, then the focal firm’s
CFO is underpaid, and it is coded as one, otherwise, it is coded as zero.
It is worth noting that I use a more fine-grained method than Cooper et al. (2016). When
grouping firm size, they separate the sample firms into two groups, namely large and small
firms, based on industry median total assets, then 1-on-1 match on the same size group. In
terms of industry categorization, they also use Fama-French industry groups.
To make the comparison more straightforward, I arbitrarily choose zero as the cut-off point
to categorize “underpaid” and “not underpaid” CFOs. More specifically, if the residuals from
Eq.1 is negative, then the focal CFO is categorized as underpaid; if the residuals are positive,
then the focal CFO is not underpaid. Then I compare the similarity between the underpaid
CFOs identified using my model and the underpaid CFOs identified based on the above
matching process using Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
The row of “Zero” shows the number of observations identified as underpaid based on my
model is consistent with that identified based on the univariate measure. In the first column of
Table 6, when firms are matched on the decile of total assets, industry, and year, it shows that
63.1% of underpaid CFOs identified by the matching process are consistent with that identified
by the model used in this study.
In addition to firm size proxied by total assets, in the second column I also add firm
performance, which is proxied by return on assets, in the matching process. More specifically,
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in this step the sample is matched on year, industry, the decile of total assets, as well as the
decile of ROA. The result then shows that the percentage of consistency increases to 66.4%.
It is difficult to determine whether a higher percentage of consistency, which means a better
match between the matching process used in the literature and the model used in my study,
indicates a higher validity for my measure. This is partly because, to my knowledge, there is
no study in the literature of executive compensation that analyzes the under- or over-payment
of CFO compensation, the focus is still on CEO compensation. In other words, their measure
based on CEO compensation and my measure based on CFO compensation may not be
comparable in the first place. However, I argue that my model, after considering factors from
multiple dimensions (i.e., firm characteristics, executive characteristics, and corporate
governance), can still shed additional light on the measurement of perceived fairness in
executive compensation.
According to social comparison theory, individual characteristics are important inputs for
forming fairness perceptions. Thus, the residuals from a model considering several factors
including CFO characteristics, could be a more appropriate measure than the deviation in
compensation from a matched firm based on firm size and financial performance only.
Further, an in-and-out of sample testing is conducted to test the validity of the model. Using
the year 2017 as an arbitrary cut-off point, I run Equation 1 using the data up to 2017, to predict
CFO compensation (i.e., the dependent variable). I then compare the actual CFO compensation
with the predicted CFO compensation from 2018 to 2020. I find that the mean absolute

73

percentage error (MAPE) is 6.68%, indicating a reasonable fit of the model. Additionally, I use
the predicted CFO compensation as the dependent variable to run Eq.1 with the same
independent variables from 2018 to 2020. The significance of the coefficients are unchanged
and the values are virtually identical. The above results are not affected by different cut-off
points15.
2.4.4 The relationship between discretionary accruals and perceived fairness in CFO pay
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics for the model testing the main hypothesis. Consistent
with the studies that use modified Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals, the median
is zero, and the mean is very close to zero (0.0002). To put the perceived fairness in CFO
compensation into perspective, if zero cut-off point is used, there are 3,867 (45.6%) firm-years
where the CFO is underpaid, and 4,610 (54.4%) firm-years where the CFO is not underpaid.
Additionally, CFOs in my sample have significant stock holdings, which is consistent with the
literature that documents a non-trivial portion of executive compensation consisting of
performance-based pay. In my sample, there are 1,272 (15.01%) firm-years with a loss, and
7,205 (84.99%) firm-years without a loss. There are 7,629 (90%) firm-years that employ one
of the largest four audit firms, while only 848 (10%) firm-years are otherwise. This is consistent

15

Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) could also be used to verify the model fit.
As I am not trying to compare models, but to control for factors that are found to be related to executive compensation in the
literature and are likely to be considered by executives when forming fairness perceptions, I have not chosen these techniques.
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with my expectation that a significant portion of the firms in Compustat are larger firms that
are able to spend higher fees on reputable audit firms.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
Table 8 shows the correlational matrix for Eq.3. Consistent with my expectation, CFOs
who perceive they are unfairly compensated manage earnings using discretionary accruals.
Firms’ growth opportunity, financial performance, audit quality, capital needs, and financial
analysts following are significantly correlated with discretionary accruals, and the directions
of the correlations are consistent with my expectations. Loss in the previous year is also
significantly related to discretionary accruals, but the direction is not consistent with my
expectation. The univariate relationship between discretionary accruals and the relative power
between CFOs and CEOs in the same firm is significantly negative at 5%.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
Table 9 shows the results for testing the main hypothesis. The dependent variable is the
signed discretionary accruals. There is no firm-year in my sample that has zero discretionary
accruals. Year and industry dummies are included. The F-statistic for the model is 1.88, which
is significant at 1%. The R-squared for the model is 0.097. Multicollinearity is not likely to be
a problem in this model, as the largest VIF is for CFO tenure with the firm, which is 3.36.
Consistent with the main hypothesis, the coefficient of underpaid is significantly positive
at 1%. More specifically, firms with CFOs who perceive they are unfairly compensated have
higher income-increasing earnings management using discretionary accruals. The coefficient
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is also economically significant. The average marginal effect of the coefficient is 0.005, which
means that on average firms with CFOs who perceive they are more unfairly compensated
manage earnings upward by 0.5% of total assets1617.
The relationships between discretionary accruals and most control variables are consistent
with my expectations. The sign of the coefficient on financial leverage is inconsistent with my
expectation, but the relationship is insignificant. Firms with a loss in the previous period engage
in less accruals management. This is inconsistent with my expectation. The possible
explanation is that some firms with a loss may choose other avenues to boost earnings, and this
avenue is negatively related to accruals management, for example, real activities management
(Graham et al. 2005; Zang 2012).
The auditor quality proxied by the four largest auditor firms is not significantly related to
accrual earnings management, though in the expected direction. The possible explanations for
this findings are: (1) Big4 may not be able to capture auditor quality, as suggested by Xie et al.
(2003) that the size of the auditor firms cannot reflect auditor quality, but relates to some firm
characteristics (e.g., firm size). In other words, there is no significant difference in auditor
quality between larger and smaller auditor firms; and (2) even if the variable is a valid proxy
for auditor quality, in the literature of earnings management the relationship between auditor
16

According to Chen, Hribar, and Melessa (2018), when residuals are used as dependent variables, the inferences may be
severely biased. As suggested by the authors to mitigate this problem, I add the control variables used to estimate
discretionary accruals to Eq. 3 and find that the direction and significance of the coefficient of interest are unchanged, and
the coefficients on the additional control variables are insignificant but in the expected sign.
17

Since discretionary accruals are estimated pooled cross-sectionally, perceived fairness in executive compensation, the
independent variable of interest in the same model, is also estimated in a similar manner (i.e., separately for each year and
industry combination). The inference is not changed, but the coefficient of interest is only significant at 10% in a two-tailed
test. This practice is consistent with Mayers and Smith (1992) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008).
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quality and earnings management is inconclusive. A significant number of firms tend to employ
the same auditor for a prolonged period, thus a long-term relationship could be developed
between a firm and its auditor. This relationship may prevent auditors exposing within-GAAP
accounting manipulations, for example earnings management. Kim et al. (2015) find that there
is a negative relationship between auditor quality and auditor tenure, which is consistent with
the auditor entrenchment argument above.
2.5 Additional analyses
2.5.1 Real earnings management
In the first additional analysis, I test if the relationship in the main hypothesis holds for real
earnings management. It is reported that real earnings management has gained popularity over
accruals management in recent years as investors and regulators increasingly detect and punish
the latter (Graham et al. 2005; Zang 2012). Zang (2012) also reports a substitutive relationship
between the two methods of earnings management. Though there seems to be a shift from
accruals earnings management to real earnings management, I do not have a priori expectation
regarding the relationship between real earnings management and perceived fairness in
executive compensation. This is because, as mentioned before, the higher costs and lower
controllability of real earnings management may prevent executives from engaging in it, and
the flexibility in timing afforded by accruals management is more salient for executives who
intend to manipulate earnings around year-end.
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According to the widely recognized method based on Roychowdhury (2006), real earnings
management is proxied by abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs,
and abnormal discretionary expenditures. In terms of abnormal cash flow from operations,
similar to the estimation of discretionary accruals, for each industry-year combination, I use
Eq.4 below to estimate the normal component of cash flow from operations, then I take the
residuals as the abnormal part. The same estimation procedure is also applied to abnormal
production costs (Eq.5) and abnormal discretionary expenditures (Eq.6). Discretionary
expenditures are the sum of Research & Development expenses (R&D), Advertising expenses,
and Selling, General, and Administrative expenses (SG&A). I also make sure that each
industry-year combination has at least ten observations. In the models, A represents total assets,
while S is total sales.
Consistent with the literature (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Zhou et al. 2016), also for the sake
of consistency with discretionary accruals, I multiply the residuals from Eqs. 4 & 6 by (-1). In
this way, for the three measures, positive values indicate income-increasing earnings
management. The three measures, as well as the sum of them are the proxies for real earnings
management used in the analysis below.
The level of individual and composite real earnings management measures are consistent
with the literature (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012; Park 2016), which are close to zero18.
Also consistent with the literature, the raw measure of abnormal cash flow from operations (i.e.,

For example, Cohen et al. (2008) reported that the mean and median of the composite real earnings management measure
is 0.00 and 0.00, while in my study they are -0.0004 and 0.002, respectively.
18
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before multiplied by -1) is positively related to the raw measure of abnormal discretionary
expenditures, and negatively related to abnormal production costs. The univariate correlations
between the perceived fairness in CFO compensation and abnormal production costs, abnormal
discretionary expenses, and the composite measure are significantly positive at 1%, while for
the abnormal cash flow from operations the correlation is significant at 10%.19
I then run regressions separately for the four measures with independent variables the same
as in Eq.3. Instead of the contemporaneous model used in the main analysis, all independent
variables are lagged by one period to reflect the inflexibility of real earnings management. The
results are shown in Table 10.
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[Insert Table 10 around here]
Table 10 shows that the coefficients for four measures are all significant with varying
degrees. The coefficient on abnormal cash flow from operations is significant at 10%, while
the other three are significant at 1%. The results indicate that despite the potential costs,
uncontrollability, and inflexibility, firms with executives who perceive they are unfairly

The correlations between perceived fairness in CFO compensation and abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal
production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, and the composite measure are 2.18%, 8.64%, 11.27%, and 10.46%
respectively.
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compensated still engage in real earnings management. This result is consistent with the
argument that executives may extend discounts and relaxed credit terms to customers,
overproduce, and reduce discretionary expenditures to enhance short-term firm performance.
2.5.2 Perceived fairness in three components of executive compensation
In the second additional analysis, I test which component(s) of CFO compensation drives the
relationship between earnings management and perceived fairness in executive compensation
in the main analysis. More specifically, total compensation is separated into three components:
salary, bonus, and equity-based compensation (i.e., stock and option grants for the period). I
then replace total compensation with each component to estimate the perceived fairness and
re-run the regression in Eq.3. The results are presented in Table 11.
[Insert Table 11 around here]
The result shows that equity-based compensation is positively related to discretionary
accruals at 1%, while the other two components do not significantly affect discretionary
accruals20. This finding confirms that the result based on total compensation is not due to a
particular model specification employed and is consistent with the literature that demonstrates
that executives engage in earnings management to increase their equity-based compensation.

It is best to be cautious in interpreting the coefficient on bonus as there is a significant number of observations with zero
bonus (around 74%). I can replace zero bonus with one and take the natural logarithm, but this may reduce the power of the
tests.
20
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2.5.3 The perceived fairness in CEO compensation and discretionary accruals
In the third additional analysis, I replicate the main test using CEO compensation instead of
CFO compensation. Due to the significant position CEOs hold in their firms and the focus on
CEOs in the literature of executive compensation, it may be interesting to analyze if the positive
impact of perceived fairness in CFO compensation (“UNDERPAID_CFO”) on earnings
management can be generalized to CEOs. In Eq.1 I replace total CFO compensation with total
CEO compensation and estimate the perceived fairness in CEO compensation
(“UNDERPAID_CEO”) as the residuals. Then I multiple the residuals by (-1) in that a higher
value indicates the focal CEO is more unfairly compensated. I use this measure to re-run the
regression in Eq.3, and the result is reported in Table 12.
[Insert Table 12 around here]
Table 12 shows that consistent with my expectation, the perceived fairness in CEO
compensation is not significantly related to discretionary accruals. This finding is consistent
with the arguments made earlier that CFOs who perceive they are unfairly compensated are
more likely to manipulate discretionary accruals to restore fairness than CEOs.
Dikolli et al. (2020) find that CFOs’ organizational behaviors are significantly affected by
CEOs in the same firm. Along with this line of reasoning, it is possible that the level of earnings
management employed by CFOs is under the direction of CEOs who also perceive themselves
to be unfairly compensated. If this is the case, then the relationship between the perceived
fairness in CFO compensation and discretionary accruals should no longer be significantly
81

positive after controlling for the perceived fairness in CEO compensation. More specifically, it
is possible that the relationship reported in the main analysis is driven by the perceived fairness
in CEO compensation.
[Insert Table 13 around here]
To rule out this possibility, I include the perceived fairness in CFO and CEO compensation
and both CEO and CFO duality in the same model. The model specification is the same as in
Eq.3 other than that. The result is reported in Table 13, which shows that after controlling for
the perceived fairness in CEO compensation, the coefficient on UNDERPAID_CFO is still
significantly positive. Further, the coefficient on UNDERPAID_CEO is not significant, though
positive. This is inconsistent with the argument that CFOs who engage in earnings management
are under the direction of CEOs who perceive themselves as unfairly compensated.
Additionally, the coefficient on CEO duality, which is an indicator variable that equals one if
CEOs also serve on the board, is significantly negative. This is consistent with the argument
that CEOs, compared to CFOs, may choose avenues other than discretionary accruals to boost
earnings due to their higher managerial power.
[Insert Table 14 around here]
I also interact “UNDERPAID_CEO” with “UNDERPAID_CFO” to provide further
corroborating evidence. If CFOs who manipulate earnings using discretionary accruals are
under the direction of their direct superiors, then CFOs’ perception of fairness regarding their
own pay should not play a role in the level of earnings management when interacted with CEOs’
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perception of fairness. More specifically, the coefficient on the “UNDERPAID_CEO” should
be significantly positive, while the coefficient on “UNDERPAID_CFO” should not be
significant. The results are shown in Table 14.
Opposite to the prediction based on the argument that the significantly positive relationship
between “UNDERPAID_CFO” and discretionary accruals is driven by “UNDERPAID_CEO”,
Table 14 shows that the coefficient on “UNDERPAID_CFO” is still significantly positive,
while the coefficient on “UNDERPAID_CEO” is positive, but insignificant. The significantly
negative coefficient on the interaction term could be interpreted as when CFOs and CEOs are
both unfairly compensated, CFOs are not incentivized to manage earnings aggressively. The
possible explanation is that CFOs could tolerate some extent of unfair compensation if they
perceive their direct superiors are also unfairly treated.
[Insert Table 15 around here]
As a supplemental analysis, I categorize CFOs and CEOs into “underpaid” and “not
underpaid” using zero as the cut-off point. This analysis provides some supporting evidence
for my measure of the perceived fairness in executive compensation. As shown in Table 15, of
the 8,442 observations, there are 3,463 (41.02%) observations that identify CEOs as underpaid,
and 3,993 (47.30%) observations that identify CFOs as underpaid. This is consistent with the
general wisdom that CEOs, who are in a position to participate in the pay-setting process, are
less likely to be underpaid than CFOs.
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It is an unlikely scenario (10.81%) that a CEO is identified as underpaid, while the CFO
in the same firm is identified as not underpaid. Consistent with Brink et al. (2020) that CEO
compensation is positively related to their subordinates’ compensation, there are a considerable
number of observations that show that CEOs and CFOs in the same firm are respectively
simultaneously underpaid (2,550) or not underpaid (3,536).
2.6 Robustness tests
2.6.1 Discretionary accruals and perceived fairness in a lead-lag model
In the first robustness test, I analyze the relationship between discretionary accruals and the
perceived fairness in CFO compensation by lagging all the independent variables by one period.
The results are shown in Table 16.
Table 16 shows that the coefficient on the perceived fairness in CFO compensation in the
previous period is significantly positive at 5%. In other words, firms with executives who
perceive they are unfairly compensated have higher earnings management in the current period
and in the following period. The reduced significance compared to the main analysis could be
interpreted as CFOs who perceive they are unfairly compensated manipulate earnings more
aggressively in the same period than in the next period, possibly due to the flexibility afforded
by accruals management.
[Insert Table 16 around here]
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2.6.2 The effect of perceived fairness for underpaid and not underpaid CFOs
In the second robustness test, I interacted the continuous measure of perceived fairness in CFO
compensation used in the main analysis with the indicator measure with a cut-off point of zero.
The purpose of this analysis is to find out if the strength of the relationship between
discretionary accruals and perceived fairness in CFO compensation is different for CFOs who
are perceived to be under-compensated (i.e., executive compensation is below the benchmark
identified by the model) versus those who are perceived not to be. The results are tabulated in
Table 17.
[Insert Table 17 around here]
Table 17 shows that while the coefficient on the continuous measure of perceived fairness
in CFO compensation is still significantly positive at 5%, the coefficients on the indicator
measure and the interaction term are not significant. As with the result in the main analysis,
this finding is consistent with the argument that the more unfairly compensated CFOs are
perceived to be, the more income-increasing earnings management they would engage in.
Further, this finding could be interpreted as not only CFOs who perceive themselves to be
under-compensated manipulate earnings upwards, but also that those who do not perceive
themselves to be under-compensated have the incentive to manipulate earnings upwards. This
is consistent with the agency theory’s prediction.
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2.6.3 Alternative measure of perceived fairness in executive compensation
In this section, I replace my measure of perceived fairness in executive compensation with
Cooper et al.’s (2016) measure that is based on firm size, performance, industry, and year and
re-run the regression in Eq.3. The result is presented in Table 18, which shows that the
coefficient on Cooper et al.’s (2016) measure is positive, but not significant, at the conventional
level.
[Insert Table 18 around here]
Based on social comparison theory, executives who perceive they are unfairly
compensated have the incentive to take action to restore fairness, thus the perceived fairness in
executive compensation should significantly affect earnings management which is considered
one of the avenues available to restore fairness. Yet, the empirical evidence that supports this
argument could only be found when the measure truly represents individuals’ fairness
perceptions. Assuming that both my measure and Cooper et al.’s (2016) measure incorporate
some aspects of fairness considerations, then my measure seems to better capture CFOs’ unfair
perceptions regarding their own pay.
2.7 Conclusions
In this study, I analyze the relationship between the perceived fairness in executive
compensation and earnings management. There is abundant research on the effect of
managerial pay on the manipulation of earnings in the literature, but the evidence is mixed. The
current study provides a more nuanced understanding by estimating perceived fairness in
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executive compensation based on social comparison theory. The empirical result sheds some
light on the inconclusive findings in the literature by showing that firms with CFOs who
perceive they are unfairly compensated have higher earnings management. This result is robust
to different types of earnings management (i.e., real earnings management), an alternative
measure of perceived underpayment in CFO compensation, and a counter argument that the
level of earnings management employed by CFOs is directed by CEOs.
It is necessary to exercise caution when interpreting this study, given the following
ambiguities. Firstly, with regard to the measure of perceived fairness in executive
compensation, I cannot conclude that the variables controlled for in Eq.2 contain a complete
set of information that would be considered by CFOs when forming fairness perceptions. For
example, geographic location of firms’ headquarters, costs of living where executives live, the
tax rates they face, and a composite score for corporate governance could be potential
candidates to have a significant impact on executive compensation and be considered by
executives when forming fairness perceptions regarding their pay. I also cannot conclude that
the variables used in the model would be considered by executives at all. This problem could
be addressed to some extent by use of a survey study, directly asking executives which factors
they consider when they evaluate if they are fairly compensated.
Secondly, in the main model (i.e., Eq.3), both the dependent variable (i.e., discretionary
accruals) and the independent variable of interest (i.e., the proxy for perceived fairness in
executive compensation) are residuals from Eq.1 and Eq.2, respectively. According to Chen,
Hribar, and Melessa (2018), the inferences may have severe measurement error. Though I try
87

to mitigate this problem as suggested by the authors (as shown in Footnote 15), this
measurement error may still plague my results.
Thirdly, though the empirical results support the argument that the perceived fairness in
executive compensation affects managers’ organizational behaviors, I cannot conclude that
there is causality between the two constructs. More specifically, executives who perceive they
are unfairly compensated may not, as is assumed in the analysis, attempt to restore fairness in
the near future. Further, executives who perceive they are unfairly compensated may engage
in earnings management without fairness considerations at all.
Fourthly, the generalizability of the results cannot be warranted. The analysis in this paper
is based on large public firms listed in the U.S. (i.e., S&P 1,500), which may not be generalized
to private firms in the U.S. and firms listed in other countries. Managers in closely held private
firms may act differently from executives in public firms when receiving unfair treatments, and
managers in a collectivist culture (e.g., China) may be inclined to negotiate instead of
aggressively manipulate earnings when compensated unfairly. Additionally, because accruals
are calculated differently for utility and financial services firms, these firms are excluded from
the analysis. However, I encourage future studies that analyze the relationship between fairness
perceptions in executive compensation and some managerial behaviors other than earnings
management to include these firms as the findings of such studies may be significantly
impacted by their inclusion.
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Despite the above limitations, the current study has some implications for academics and
practitioners. By incorporating social comparison theory in the relationship between executive
compensation and earnings management, this study attempts to provide a more nuanced
explanation for the relationship, which complements the existing widely-adopted explanation
based on agency theory.
This study supports the practice of the board of directors in some firms of benchmarking
in the pay setting process. However, some caution should be taken when choosing peers for
benchmarking, because there may be some incompatibilities between managers’ and the board
of directors’ choice of referents. In other words, in order to avoid managers’ opportunistic
behaviors, the board of directors should take into account the factors that managers consider
when forming fairness perceptions. Simply choosing firms in a similar industry with a similar
firm size may not work as intended.
The current study could be extended in several ways. Firstly, executives who perceive they
are unfairly compensated could take other actions than earnings management to restore fairness.
As stated in social comparison theory, the unfairness is manifested in the imbalanced ratio of
inputs and outcome compared to others. More specifically, individuals perceive they are
unfairly treated when they exert more effort and/or receive less outcome compared to others.
While earnings management could be construed as increasing outcome, it may be interesting
to analyze if underpaid executives might also take action to reduce efforts.
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Secondly, it may be fruitful to analyze if the perceived fairness in executive compensation
has any impact on managerial behaviors that have long-term implications for a firm’s
performance. For example, with firms in polluting industries (e.g., fuel and transportation) who
may rely on charitable donations to mitigate the negative publicity arising from the firms’
operation, it could be interesting to find out whether the level of pro-social behaviors engaged
in by managers is affected by their fairness perceptions regarding their compensation.
Thirdly, which factors executives consider when forming fairness perceptions warrants
further research. More specifically, would executives put more weight on factors that are
related to a firm’s characteristics and corporate governance environment or would they be more
likely to evaluate their current compensation based on their compensation in the previous
periods or in previous employment?
Lastly, similar analysis in different contexts could be conducted, such as analyzing the
behavior of executives in private firms when receiving unfair treatments. Instead of reporting
unsubstantiated earnings, executives in private firms may choose other means to restore
fairness because of their closer relationship with the principals, or because the closer
monitoring from the principals in private firms prevents them from managing earnings.
Furthermore, social norms dictate which behaviors are acceptable and preferable for
restoring fairness; similarly, the choice of referents used in social comparisons may be different
in different cultural backgrounds. In collectivistic societies that emphasize collaboration and
cooperation, individuals may tend to focus more on extrinsic characteristics such as external
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environment when comparing their inputs and outcome with others. In individualistic societies
that emphasize more self-awareness and self-development, individuals may be more likely to
evaluate their inputs and outcome based on intrinsic characteristics such as their previous work
experience.
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Eq.1
Variable
CFOComp
FirmSize
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
Stockvolatility
Leverage
Growth
CFOAGE
Horizon
Tenure
Gender
CFO duality
Relative power

Obs
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165
10,165

Mean

Median

7.283
8.054
0.049
0.133
0.099
0.558
3.428
51.53
0.055
7.692
0.903
0.123
0.449

7.316
7.961
0.048
0.102
0.085
0.558
2.231
52
0
8
1
0
0.375

s.d.
0.855
1.783
0.091
0.413
0.056
0.223
4.162
6.656
0.227
4.643
0.296
0.328
0.343

Min
5.256
4.144
-0.317
-0.748
0.028
0.085
0.394
36
0
1
0
0
0.061

25 percentile

75 percentile

6.689
6.796
0.011
-0.115
0.061
0.406
1.399
47
0
4
1
0
0.282

7.871
9.170
0.091
0.329
0.121
0.722
3.706
56
0
11
1
0
0.507

Max
9.299
13.01
0.327
1.757
0.335
0.960
30.08
67
1
26
1
1
2.643

CFOComp is the natural log of total CFO compensation for the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is annualized stock return;
Stockvolatility is the standard deviation of monthly holding returns over the previous 12 months;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFOs' age;
Horizon is an indicator that equals one when the CFO is 65 years old or beyond, and zero otherwise;

Tenure is the number of years the CFO is with the firm;
Gender is an indicator that equals one when the CFO is male, and zero when female;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%
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Table 4 Pearson correlational matrix for Eq.1
CFOComp FirmSize FirmFinPerf FirmMktPerf
CFOComp
FirmSize
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
Stock
volatility
Leverage
Growth
CFOAGE
Horizon
Tenure
Gender
CFO duality
Relative
power

Stock
volatility

Leverage

1
0.64***
0.13***
0.04***

1
0.02***
-0.05***

1
0.17***

-0.22***

-0.31***

-0.29***

0.17***
0.14***
0.11***
-0.03***
0.15***
0.01*
0.03***

0.52***
-0.03***
0.08***
-0.01
0.09***
0.01
-0.01*

-0.23***
0.21***
0.02**
0.01
-0.01
-0.03***
0.01

-0.05***
0.20***
0.01
0.03***
0.01*
-0.01*
0.01

-0.05***
-0.07***
-0.05***
-0.04***
-0.12***
0.02**
0.01

1
0.19***
0.02**
-0.01
0.02**
0.03***
0.01

0.05***

-0.07***

-0.04***

-0.02**

0.09***

-0.05***

CFO
AGE

Growth

Horizon

Tenure

Gender

CFO
duality

Relative
power

1
0.00

1

1
0.02*
0.01
0.05***
0.01
0.00
-0.01

1
0.35***
0.19***
0.06***
0.04***

1
- 0.08***
1
0.03*** 0.02**
1
0.00
0.12*** 0.04***

0.01

-0.01

1

0.03*** 0.06*** 0.09***

1

CFOComp is the natural log of total CFO compensation for the period; FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is annualized stock return;
Stockvolatility is the standard deviation of monthly holding returns over the previous 12 months;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFOs' age; Horizon is an indicator that equals one when the CFO is 65 years old or beyond, and zero otherwise;
Tenure is the number of years the CFO is with the firm;
Gender is an indicator that equals one when the CFO is male, and zero when female;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
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Table 5

Perceived fairness in CFO compensation

Dependent variable

CFOComp

FirmSize
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
Stockvolatility
Leverage
Growth
CFOAGE
Horizon
Tenure
Gender
CFO duality
Relative power
Year dummy
Industry dummy
N
R-squared
F-statistics

0.380***
0.352***
0.092***
0.255
-0.285***
0.018***
0.006***
-0.169***
-0.007*
0.032
0.160***
0.305***
controlled
controlled
10,165
0.6072
65.23

Robust standard errors are clustered by firm; Fama-French 48 industry categorization is employed;
CFOComp is the natural log of total CFO compensation for the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is annualized stock return;
Stockvolatility is the standard deviation of monthly holding returns over the previous 12 months;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFOs' age;
Horizon is an indicator that equals one when the CFO is 65 years old or beyond, and zero otherwise;
Tenure is the number of years the CFO is with the firm;
Gender is an indicator that equals one when the CFO is male, and zero when female;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
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Table 6 Validation of the measure for perceived fairness in executive compensation

Sign

Firm size

Firm size and
performance

Positive
Negative
Zero

2,672
1,075
6,418

1,466
1,949
6,750

Sum

10,165

10,165

Firm size is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Firm performance is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
“Zero” means that my measure of perceived fairness in CFO compensation is consistent with Cooper et al. (2016)’s;
“Positive” means that my measure finds the CFO is underpaid, but their measure does not;
“Negative” means that my measure finds the CFO is not underpaid, but Cooper et al. (2016)’s measure does
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for Eq.3
Variable
DA
UNDERPAID
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
Relative power

Obs
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477
8,477

Mean
0.001
-0.011
7.765
3.561
7.833
0.507
0.058
0.150
0.900
0.412
4.634
0.111
0.435

Median
0
-0.050
7.727
2.431
7.728
0.519
0.061
0
1
0
3
0
0.363

s.d.
0.039
0.504
1.023
3.950
1.655
0.200
0.094
0.357
0.299
0.492
5.361
0.315
0.331

Min
-0.120
-1.167
5.332
0.394
4.144
0.085
-0.315
0
0
0
0
0
0.061

25 Percentile
-0.019
-0.322
7.043
1.539
6.637
0.363
0.023
0
1
0
1
0
0.278

75 Percentile
0.020
0.268
8.447
3.977
8.937
0.648
0.102
0
1
1
6
0
0.488

Max
0.123
1.332
10.41
30.08
13.01
0.959
0.327
1
1
1
47
1
2.629

DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period; Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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Table 8 Pearson correlational matrix for Eq.3

DA
DA
UNDERPAID
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
Relative
power

UNDERPAID

Stock
Hold

1
0.03***
-0.01
-0.04***
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02*
-0.04***
-0.02*
0.08***
-0.03***
0.01

1
-0.44***
0.01
-0.01
-0.03***
0.01
-0.03***
-0.08***
0.00
-0.01
0.01

1
0.25***
0.64***
0.21***
0.26***
-0.19***
0.25***
-0.03***
0.33***
0.02**

-0.02**

-0.02**

0.02**

Growth

FirmSize Leverage FirmFinPerf

Loss

Big4

1
0.07***
0.30***
0.25***
-0.08***
0.05***
-0.06***
0.17***
0.01

1
0.45***
0.10***
-0.19***
0.35***
-0.07***
0.40***
-0.06***

1
-0.18***
0.02*
0.24***
0.01
0.07***
-0.04***

-0.01

-0.13***

-0.10***

Capital_needs

Analysts

1
-0.41***
0.04***
-0.12***
0.16***
0.04***

1
-0.09***
0.05***
-0.13***
-0.02*

1
-0.06***
0.14***
-0.02

1
-0.07***
0.01

1
-0.07***

-0.03***

0.06***

-0.06***

0.04***

-0.04**

CFO
duality

Relative
power

1
0.10***

1

DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period; Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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Table 9 The relationship between discretionary accruals and perceived fairness in
CFO compensation
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽11 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛴𝛽𝑚 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑚 + 𝛴𝛽𝑛 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

Dependent variable
UNDERPAID
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
Relative power

Expected Sign

+
+
+
+
+/+/-

Year dummy
Industry dummy
N
R-squared
F-statistics

DA
0.005***
0.003***
-0.001**
-0.002**
0.005
-0.01
-0.01***
-0.002
0.01***
-0.0002
0.001
-0.004**
controlled
controlled
8,477
0.097
1.88***

DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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Table 10 The relationship between real earnings management and perceived fairness in executive compensation

Dependent variable

Abnormal cash flow
from operations_(t+1)

Abnormal
production
costs_(t+1)

Abnormal
discretionary
expenses_(t+1)

Real earnings
management_(t+1)

UNDERPAID
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
Relative power

0.005*
0.002
-0.004***
-0.002
0.05***
-0.24***
0.01**
0.01**
0.01***
-0.001***
-0.001
-0.01

0.019***
0.002
-0.01***
0.002
0.06***
-0.20***
-0.01
-0.02*
0.02***
-0.002***
0.01
0.002

0.022***
-0.003
-0.01***
0.01*
0.07***
0.15***
-0.02***
-0.05***
0.002
-0.002***
0.02*
0.01

0.046***
0.001
-0.02***
0.01
0.179***
-0.294***
-0.02
-0.06***
0.04***
-0.01***
0.03
0.002

Year dummies
Industry dummies

controlled
controlled

controlled
controlled

controlled
controlled

controlled
controlled

7,704
0.233
9.39***

7,704
0.101
3.15***

7,704
0.0722
9.39***

7,704
0.1136
3.24***

N
R-squared
F-statistics

Abnormal cash flow from operations is the residuals from Eq.4 multiplied by (-1); Abnormal production costs is the residuals from Eq.5.
Abnormal discretionary expenses is the residuals from Eq.6 multiplied by (-1).
Real earnings management is the sum of abnormal production costs, abnormal cash flow from operations, and abnormal discretionary expenses.
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period; Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm; CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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Table 11 Discretionary accruals and perceived fairness in different components of
CFO compensation

CFO compensation

Salary

UNDERPAID
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
Relative power

-0.001
0.0003
-0.0004*
-0.001
0.002
-0.01
-0.01***
-0.002
0.01***
-0.0001
0.002
-0.003*

Year dummies
Industry dummies

controlled
controlled

N
R-squared
F-statistics

8,447
0.0978
1.55***

Bonus

0.001
0.001
-0.001*
-0.001
0.007
0.005
-0.003
-0.003
0.01***
0.0001
-0.003
-0.002
controlled
controlled

Equity

0.005***
0.003***
-0.001**
-0.002**
0.004
-0.01
-0.007***
-0.001
0.01***
-0.0001
0.001
-0.004**
controlled
controlled

8,447
0.0975
1.60***

8,447
0.0987
1.86***

Robust standard errors are clustered by firm.
Salary is the cash compensation for the period;
Bonus is the compensation rewarded to CFOs when certain financial performance is achieved;
Equity compensation is consisted of stock grants and option grants for the period;
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period; Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the
period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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Table 12 The relationship between earnings management
and perceived fairness in CEO compensation
Dependent variable

DA

UNDERPAID_CEO
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CEO duality

-0.0002
0.0002
-0.0002
-0.0001
0.001
-0.005
-0.006***
-0.0001
0.008***
-0.0002**
-0.003

Year dummy
Industry dummy

controlled
controlled

N
R-squared
F-statistics

11,302
0.0811
2.03***

Robust standard errors are clustered by firm
DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);
UNDERPAID_CEO is estimated using Eq.1, but the dependent variable is total CEO compensation;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CEO duality is an indicator that equals one if the CEO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise
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Table 13 Earnings management and perceived fairness
in CFO pay with perceived fairness in CEO pay
controlled
Dependent variable
UNDERPAID_CFO
UNDERPAID_CEO
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
CEO duality
Relative power
Year dummy
Industry dummy
N
R-squared
F-statistics

DA
0.004**
0.001
0.003***
-0.001**
-0.002**
0.004
-0.011
-0.007***
-0.001
0.007***
-0.0001
0.001
-0.005**
-0.005*
controlled
controlled
8,442
0.0864
1.72***

DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);
UNDERPAID_CFO and UNDERPAID_CEO are continuous variables that equal the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1,
using total CFO pay and total CEO pay, respectively;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality and CEO duality are indicators that equal one when the CFO or CEO also serves on the board;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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Table 14 Discretionary accruals and the interaction between perceived
fairness in CEO and CFO pay
Dependent variable
UNDERPAID_CFO
UNDERPAID_CEO
UNDERPAID_CFO*UNDERPAID_CEO
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
CEO duality
Relative power
Year dummy
Industry dummy
N
R-squared
F-statistics

DA
0.004**
0.001
-0.003**
0.003***
-0.001**
-0.002**
0.004
-0.012
-0.007***
-0.001
0.007***
-0.0001
0.001
-0.005*
-0.005
controlled
controlled
8,442
0.0871
1.66***

DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);
UNDERPAID_CFO and UNDERPAID_CEO are continuous variables that equal the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1,
using total CFO pay and total CEO pay, respectively;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality and CEO duality are indicators that equal one when the CFO or CEO also serves on the board;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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Table 15 Perceived fairness in CFO compensation and in CEO compensation
Underpaid_CFO
0
1
Total

Underpaid_CEO
0
1
3,536
913
1,443
2,550
4,979
3,463

Total
4,449
3,993
8,442

Underpaid_CFO is an indicator that equals one if the residuals from Eq.1 are negative, and zero otherwise, when total CFO
compensation is the dependent variable;
Underpaid_CEO is an indicator that equals one if the residuals from Eq.1 are negative and zero otherwise, when total CEO
compensation is the dependent variable
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Table 16 The relationship between discretionary accruals and
perceived fairness in CFO compensation in the previous period
Dependent variable
UNDERPAID
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
Relative power
Year dummy
Industry dummy

DA_t+1
0.003**
0.003***
-0.0001
-0.002***
-0.002
-0.011
-0.001
0.001
0.001
-0.0003*
0.001
-0.005***
controlled
controlled

N
R-squared
F-statistics

7,393
0.0538
2.48***

DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm

105

Table 17 Discretionary accruals and the interaction between
continuous and indicator measures of perceived fairness
Dependent variable
UNDERPAID
UNDERPAID_d
UNDERPAID*UNDERPAID_d
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
Relative power
Year dummy
Industry dummy
N
R-squared
F-statistics

DA
0.005**
0.001
-0.002
0.003***
-0.001**
-0.002**
0.004
-0.01
-0.007***
-0.001
0.007***
-0.0001
0.001
-0.004**
controlled
controlled
8,429
0.0984
1.85***

DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;

UNDERPAID_d is an indicator that equals one when the residuals from Eq.1 are negative, and zero otherwise;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period; Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the
period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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Table 18 Discretionary accruals and alternative measure
of underpayment in CFO compensation
Dependent variable

DA

Underpaid
StockHold
Growth
FirmSize
Leverage
FirmFinPerf
Loss
Big4
Capital_needs
Analysts
CFO duality
Relative power

0.002
0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
-0.01
-0.01***
-0.003
0.007**
-0.0002
-0.003
-0.01**

Year dummy
Industry dummy

controlled
controlled

N
R-squared
F-statistics

3,646
0.0467
3.18***

DA is discretionary accruals using modified Jones model (Eq.2);

Underpaid in this model is estimated using Cooper et al. (2016)'s method;
StockHold is the natural log of CFOs' stock holdings at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Big4 is an indicator that equals one if one of the largest four auditor firms is employed, and zero otherwise;
Capital_needs is an indicator that equals one if the firm is in need of external financing, and zero otherwise;
Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
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3. The Relationship Between Perceived Fairness in Executive Compensation and the
Propensity for Voluntary Turnover
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between perceived fairness in executive
compensation and the propensity for voluntary turnover. Voluntary turnover is generally
defined as when an employee leaves their current employment because they resign, are
internally transferred (usually internally promoted), or retire for personal reasons (e.g., age,
health conditions, etc.). Voluntary turnover is opposed to forced turnover, which typically
means that an employee is fired against their will.
According to this definition, voluntary turnover for executives usually is costly to their
employers. Firstly, productive managers with promising prospects are more likely to be
“headhunted” as they are desirable candidates in the managerial labor market. For the current
employer, valuable managerial talents are lost if these managers choose to work for another
firm (Dess and Shaw 2001). This is especially the case if the potential employer is a competitor
in the same or a similar industry. Secondly, it is costly for firms to find another fit for the
position, to train the new recruit to adapt to firm-specific procedures and processes, and to
transfer his/her previous work experience into useful knowledge for the new employer
(Darmon 1990; Dalton & Todor 1982).
Due to the high costs associated with voluntary turnover, it is important for the board of
directors to acknowledge under what conditions executives have a higher propensity for
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voluntary turnover and to find ways to retain scarce managerial talent. In this chapter, I examine
whether executives who are more unfairly compensated have a higher propensity for voluntary
turnover. In other words, I am interested in examining whether fairness perceptions regarding
executive compensation are associated with alternative and arguably more extreme actions
besides earnings management, for example, voluntarily withdrawing from their current
employment, for the sake of fairness. Consistent with this argument, Wade et al. (2006) find
that in a principal-agent setting, employees who perceive they are unfairly treated (pecuniarily
or non-pecuniarily) may withdraw their efforts or even quit their jobs.
Some studies find that executive compensation is negatively related to the propensity for
voluntary turnover (e.g., Cannella and Shen 2001; Finkelstein et al. 2009; Shen et al. 2010).
The explanations are twofold. Firstly, in terms of managerial power, agency theory (Jensen and
Meckling 1976) suggests that, due to the separation of ownership and control, executives who
have managerial power over the board of directors, and, specifically, over the pay-setting
process, will have higher compensation. More powerful, and thus higher-compensated
managers are less likely to voluntarily withdraw from their current employment because they
may not enjoy equivalent power and prestige in their next employment role. Secondly,
according to tournament theory, executive compensation may act as the prize for the best
performers in an organization. In other words, boards use the sizable compensation of
executives to motivate lower-level employees to exert more effort and climb up the hierarchical
ladder. Along with this line of reasoning, executive compensation is also negatively related to
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voluntary turnover, as managers gain added benefits from the large prize and are reluctant to
leave the position voluntarily.
However, some studies on the relationship between executive compensation and voluntary
turnover have found inconsistent results. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) question the
managerial power perspective and argue that poor corporate governance is the cause for
executive entrenchment (i.e., unwillingness to leave the organization voluntarily), not the
compensation itself. In other words, the negative relationship between executive compensation
and voluntary turnover found in some studies is spurious and driven by poor corporate
governance. Further, Bloom and Michel (2002) find that the prize for CEOs does not negatively
relate to CEO turnover, but incentivizes the turnover of lower-level employees, which is at
odds with the explanation derived from tournament theory.
Recently, organizational justice theorists have shed some light on the debate, proposing
alternative reasons for the relationship between executive compensation and voluntary turnover
(e.g., Fong et al. 2010; He et al. 2017). They state that it is not the compensation itself, but the
fairness of the compensation that plays the more vital role in job satisfaction, and that the level
of job satisfaction accordingly affects organizational behavior. They find supporting evidence
for fairness in executive compensation having a significant impact on job satisfaction and
organizational commitment, which then provokes organizational behavior that aims to maintain
fairness.
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A natural question to ask next is that what types of organizational behaviors would
executives who perceive themselves to be unfairly compensated take in order to restore fairness.
Based on social comparison theory (Festinger 1954), executives who perceive they are unfairly
paid and facing the imbalance between their ratio of inputs to outcome and that of the
comparison base, have the incentive to reduce the dissonance caused by this inequity. While
the focus of the previous chapter was how earnings manipulation to superficially boost firm
performance could be construed as increasing the outcome (i.e., the denominator) of the ratio,
in this chapter, I argue that executives who are more unfairly compensated have a higher
propensity to voluntarily withdraw from their current employment, as an alternative avenue to
restore the balance of the ratio.
The literature on the relationship between executive compensation and voluntary turnover
is mainly focused on CEOs. To my knowledge, this study is the first paper to focus on the effect
of perceived fairness in CFO compensation on CFO voluntary withdrawal. Though CEOs hold
the most significant position in firms, I contend that CFOs rather than CEOs are more likely to
quit their jobs when facing unfair rewards. The reason for this is that CEOs have higher
managerial power over the board and the pay setting process, thus their range of actions for
restoring fairness is much wider than that of CFOs: CEOs can restore fairness by directly
influencing their compensation instead of taking more extreme action, such as withdrawing
from their jobs. Therefore, I chose CFOs as the more appropriate research subject and
anticipated that CFOs who perceive they are unfairly compensated will have a higher
propensity for voluntary turnover.
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In fact, I find that, consistent with my expectations, CFOs who are more unfairly
compensated have a higher propensity for voluntary turnover. In terms of the components in
executive compensation (i.e., salary, bonus, and equity-based compensation), the perceived
fairness in equity-based compensation drives this result. This finding does not hold for CEOs.
Due to the higher managerial power over the board of directors, CEOs may choose less extreme
actions other than voluntary turnover (e.g., shirking) to restore fairness.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold. Firstly, this chapter fills a gap
in the literature by analyzing the relationship between the perceived fairness in CFO
compensation and their propensity for voluntary turnover. Though the vast literature on
executive compensation is largely focused on CEOs, due to the significant position CFOs hold
in an organization, this analysis may be of some academic and practical importance for
understanding the applicability of social comparison theory in the pay-setting process, and if
fairness plays a role in the retention of scarce managerial talents.
More specifically, social comparison theory acknowledges the need of individuals who
perceive themselves to be unfairly treated to restore fairness, but the theory itself does not
explicitly state what specific actions these individuals may take for the sake of fairness. This
study aims to test whether executives who are more unfairly compensated would have a higher
propensity for extreme actions, such as voluntary turnover. Specifically, this analysis intends
to answer the question of whether social comparison theory could be used to reduce the
likelihood of a firm’s loss of managerial talent by considering fairness perceptions in executive
compensation.
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Secondly, complementary to the previous chapter on the relationship between earnings
management and perceived fairness in executive compensation, this chapter extends the scope
of the analysis by testing, besides increasing outcomes (i.e., compensation), whether executives
who perceive they are unfairly compensated may engage in actions to reduce inputs (i.e.,
efforts), to the extent that they may voluntarily quit their jobs. This is consistent with Wowak
et al.’s (2011) appeal that future research should emphasize how the perception of
underpayment affects executive behavior. By focusing on the sides of both input and outcome,
the impact that fairness perception in executive compensation has on managerial behavior can
be more comprehensively understood.
Thirdly, a significant number of firms benchmark their executives’ pay based on that of
comparable firms (Shin 2016). Bizjak et al. (2011), however, assert that this benchmarking is
opportunistically used to rationalize excessive executive compensation by choosing as peers
larger firms with highly paid executives. The authors maintain that this benchmarking is biased
and that it contributes to the rachetting-up of managerial pay instead of promoting fairness in
executive compensation. In the current study, I provide a systemic and unbiased way for a
board of directors to improve executives’ perceptions of fairness in their pay by considering
various factors in the pay-setting process, which could possibly reduce the propensity for
voluntary turnover, and thus help them to retain scarce managerial talents.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The next section reviews the related literature
and proposes the hypothesis. Section 3.3 details the research methodology. Section 3.4 presents
the empirical results. In Section 3.5, the additional analyses regarding various components of
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executive compensation and perceived fairness in CEO compensation. Section 3.6 is dedicated
to the robustness tests. In the last section, the limitations and implications of the study, as well
as future research avenues, are presented.
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development
While some studies have analyzed the relationship between executive compensation and
voluntary turnover, there is no consensus as to the significance and direction of the relationship.
Some papers find that executive compensation and voluntary turnover are negatively related.
More specifically, highly paid executives are less likely to voluntarily quit their jobs (Song and
Wan 2019). This finding is explained by the conclusion that executive compensation is
positively related to the power executives wield over boards of directors; more powerful
executives are less likely to voluntarily withdraw from their employment because their next
employment may not afford them the same power and prestige.
Finkelstein et al. (2009), however, counter the above “managerial power perspective”,
making the case that poor corporate governance is the root cause for both excessive
compensation and executives’ unwillingness to leave the organization voluntarily. They argue
that the negative relationship between executive compensation and voluntary turnover is
spurious. In other words, after controlling for variables related to corporate governance, the
effect of executive compensation on voluntary turnover largely disappears.
In addition to the compensation itself, Ridge et al. (2017) find that relative compensation,
namely the pay dispersion between executives and lower-level employees, is negatively related
114

to executive turnover. The authors define the pay dispersion as the difference in compensation
between CEOs and other members in the top management team in the same firm, as well as the
difference between the average pay of the top management team in the focal firm and that in
other firms.
This finding is consistent with tournament theory in executive compensation which
considers executive pay to be the prize for the best performers in an organization. Thus, the
compensation for executives is not only used to motivate rank and file employees’ efforts to
climb up the hierarchical ladder in an organization, but also in order to retain the managerial
talents of the executives who become the winners in the tournament. The sense of selfachievement of being an executive and the advantages derived from the monetary rewards
increase with the size of the prize. That highly paid executives are reluctant to voluntarily leave
their positions is consistent with this line of reasoning.
Nonetheless, the explanation based on tournament theory is not without debate. Bloom and
Michel (2002) find that tournament-like pay structure is not related to executive turnover, but
is positively related to the turnover of lower-level employees. They explain this finding with
the contention that tournament-like pay structure reduces job satisfaction of lower-level
employees, because either they regard the top prize as unachievable, or they think the large pay
dispersion between their pay and executives’ pay is unfair.
The inconclusive evidence on the effect of executive compensation on voluntary turnover
opens up the possibility that alternative theories may shed some light on this relationship. Some
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researchers use organizational justice theories (e.g., social comparison theory) to analyze
whether the deviation in executive compensation from the “norm” (e.g., executive
compensation in comparable firms) affects certain managerial behaviors. For example, Fong et
al. (2010) answer the call from Miller (1995) that not only the compensation itself, but also the
compensation compared to selected benchmarks should be given more consideration when
analyzing the relationship between executive compensation and managerial behaviors. They
argue that executives whose compensation is below the identified benchmark may seek more
extreme alternatives (e.g., leave the organization) rather than simply “shirking” because they
perceive their own compensation as unfair.
Consistent with Fong et al. (2010), He et al. (2017) use a sample of public Chinese firms
to analyze if the deviation in CEO compensation from the ongoing market rate (i.e., industryadjusted average compensation) is associated with the likelihood of voluntary turnover. They
find that CEOs with compensation below the labor market rate are more likely to voluntarily
quit the job. The explanation for this finding is that CEOs with compensation below the
benchmark regard themselves as unfairly treated by the principals, thus are motivated to reduce
the dissonance caused by this inequity and, consequently, choose to leave the organizations.
In addition to the aforementioned archival research, using organizational justice theories
to explain the relationship between voluntary turnover and fairness perceptions is also
supported by experimental studies. Jones and Skarlicki (2003) conducted an experiment to
analyze the relationship between fairness perceptions and voluntary turnover among
approximately 200 employees in the retail industry in Canada. They find that when the
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procedures determining the financial rewards are communicated to the employees by the
principals in an honest and considerate way, the amount of the rewards is negatively related to
the propensity for voluntary turnover.
Ryan et al. (2006) conducted an experiment using 179 IT professionals in a governmental
agency to analyze whether fairness in financial rewards affects job satisfaction, which in turn
affects the propensity for voluntary turnover. Similarly, they find consistent results that fairness
perceptions regarding financial rewards is a direct antecedent of job satisfaction and
organizational commitments, and these, in turn, impact the turnover intentions of employees.
In addition, the contributing effect of fairness perceptions in terms of compensation on
turnover intentions has been confirmed by some theoretical studies. For example, Salleh and
Memon (2015) constructed a theoretical framework, which finds that if employees are not
satisfied with their compensation (e.g., not paid as much as their peers), organizational
commitment will be negatively impacted and will manifest in lower work productivity and
efficiency. Lower engagement with the work then causes higher propensity for voluntary
turnover.
The hypothesis is developed below in alternative form:
H1: Executives who are more unfairly compensated are associated with a higher
propensity for voluntary turnover.
As mentioned above, voluntary turnover is a relatively extreme way to restore fairness.
Therefore, the attractiveness of this approach is subject to several conditions. The mobility of
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employment afforded by the macro condition of the managerial labor market, as well as the
reputation of the executives in the managerial labor market based on their expertise and
previous work experience, may significantly affect the appeal of voluntary turnover. Therefore,
even if some executives perceive they are unfairly compensated, voluntary turnover may not
be a viable and desirable avenue to take. Thus, in order to balance the ratio of inputs to
outcomes with that of their comparison base, executives may prefer alternative actions (e.g.,
earnings management or simply shirk) to voluntary turnover.
Additionally, executive turnover is a rare event compared to the number of cases in which
executives who perceive themselves as unfairly compensated are using earnings management
to equalize their negative fairness perceptions. Thus, there is a fair chance that the empirical
relationship between executives who perceive they are unfairly compensated and voluntary
turnover is not significant. This is not surprising as voluntary turnover is likely to be the last
resort for executives to restore fairness.
Despite the above counter arguments, I still expect that for at least some executives who
perceive they are unfairly compensated, voluntary turnover is a viable way to seek fairness. In
summary, perceived fairness in executive compensation should have a significant impact on
the propensity of voluntary turnover.
3.3 Research Methodology
I used the regression model below to test the relationship between perceived fairness in
executive compensation and the propensity for voluntary turnover.
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Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 )
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽9 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛴𝛽𝑚 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑚 + 𝛴𝛽𝑛 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
The studies in the literature on this relationship are mainly focused on CEOs due to their
significant role in an organization. For example, it is argued in Fong et al. (2010) that CEOs
with compensation below certain benchmarks are incentivized to engage in actions with the
intent to reduce the dissonance caused by this inequity. I contend that the statements based on
social comparison theory made for CEOs are also applicable to CFOs as they also have the
incentive to restore fairness when facing unfair treatments, as the findings in the previous
chapter suggest.
Additionally, I argue that CFOs, instead of CEOs, are more likely to voluntarily withdraw
from their employment when facing unfair treatment. Firstly, CEOs arguably are more
powerful than CFOs (Morse et al., 2011; van Essen et al. 2015) in an organization so that
instead of quitting their jobs, they may take less extreme actions for the sake of fairness. For
example, they may directly influence the pay-setting process set up by the board of directors.
Secondly, the propensity for voluntary turnover depends on mobility of employment (He et al.
2017). In other words, the desirability of voluntary turnover is positively related to how easily
the individual may find other employment. The financial expertise and professional
qualifications of CFOs, which are specifically related to financial reporting, could be more
easily transferred to another firm. In comparison, the work experience of CEOs, whose job
responsibilities are focused on overall strategic arrangements, is less likely to be directly useful
to another firm.
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As in Chapter 2, all the variables relating to firm characteristics are retrieved from
Compustat (e.g., firm performance in the current and previous periods, firm size, and firm
growth), while all the variables relating to executive characteristics are retrieved from
Execucomp (e.g., voluntary turnover, CFO age, relative power between CFOs and CEOs, and
CFO duality). For the definition of voluntary turnover as the dependent variable, I focus on the
CFOs who are likely to leave the organization voluntarily. More specifically, in order to be
qualified as voluntary turnover in this study, three criteria need to be satisfied simultaneously:
(1) the reason for turnover is stated in Execucomp (i.e., the variable “REASON” has no missing
values); (2) the CFOs leave their organizations (i.e., the date of leaving the organization is
identified in the database, and internal promotion or demotion does not fit for the purpose of
this study); and (3) the turnover is identified by the database as “retired” or “resigned”.
There are four categories in terms of the reasons for executive turnover identified in
Execucomp: “Deceased”, “Retired”, “Resigned”, and “Unknown”. As the purpose of voluntary
turnover for executives is to restore fairness by leaving the unfair environment, i.e., to find
employment in another organization with a fairer financial treatment, “deceased” is not a fit
for this definition.
I assume that most of the “unknown” cases are forced turnover and, in order to maintain
the reputation of the fired executives, firms choose not to disclose the specific reasons 21. I
acknowledge that among the cases of “retired” and “resigned”, there may be some instances of
forced turnover, for example, forced early retirement and forced resignation. Yet, as forced
21

I also regard the “unknown” cases as voluntary turnover in one of the robustness tests in section 3.6.1 on pg. 130.
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turnover is not expected to be related to perceived fairness in executive compensation, these
potential misclassifications only reduce the significance of the hypothesized relationship. In
other words, if the finding is consistent with my expectation, then the empirical results could
be construed as robust to the noise in the sample. The definitions of all the main variables can
be found in the Appendix on page 141.
In short, the dependent variable of voluntary turnover is an indicator, which equals one
when the focal executive left their firm with the identified reasons of “retired” or “resigned”
and equals zero otherwise.
UNDERPAID is the independent variable of interest, which is the continuous measure for
the perceived fairness in CFO compensation and is estimated based on the residuals in Eq. 1 of
Chapter 2. More specifically, the residuals are multiplied by -1, thus a higher value indicates
that the executive is more unfairly compensated.
For the control variables, consistent with the literature, I control for the factors relating to
firm characteristics (i.e., financial performance, market performance, firm size, growth
opportunities, and financial standing in the previous year), executive characteristics (i.e., CFO
age), and corporate governance (i.e., relative power between CFOs and CEOs and CFO duality).
Consistent with the literature on executive turnover (e.g., Balsam and Miharjo 2007; Campbell
et al. 2011), a contemporaneous regression model is used, as no material reasons could be
identified in my study for executives who are unfairly compensated to postpone the decision
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of voluntary turnover by exactly one period. Robust standard errors are employed 22 . The
sample period is from 2006, which is the first year CFO compensation is publicly available, to
202023, which is the most recent year at the time of writing. As the dependent variable is an
indicator, logit estimation method is employed24.
Firms’ financial (FirmFinPerf) performance is proxied by return on assets (ROA), which
is calculated as net income before extraordinary items over total assets at the beginning of the
period. Firms’ market performance (FirmMktPerf) is proxied by annualized stock returns,
which is calculated as the product of one plus monthly holding returns for twelve months, then
minus one25. FirmSize is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the period.
Market-to-book (MTB) ratio, which is calculated as the market value of total assets over the
book value of total assets at the end of the period, is used as the proxy for firms’ growth
prospects (Growth). The CFO’s age (CFOAGE) is included in the model. Loss is an indicator
variable that equals one if the net income before extraordinary items in the last period is
negative, and zero otherwise. The relative managerial power between CFOs and CEOs
(Relative power), which is proxied by the ratio of CFO compensation to CEO compensation,
is controlled for. CFO duality is an indicator variable coded as one if the CFO also serves on
the board and zero otherwise. Lastly, year dummies and industry dummies based on the first

Clustered standard errors are not used because there is not sufficient variance in the dependent variable for each cluster
due to the scarcity of voluntary turnover in the sample.
22

23

For some firms, the information for 2020 is missing at the time of writing.

24

Similar results can be obtained using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation method.

25

Annualized stock returns=(1+R1)(1+R2)…(1+R12)-1 where Rm is the monthly holding return.
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digit of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code (i.e., nine industries in total) are also
controlled for26.
Firms’ financial and market performance are included because it is argued in the literature
that executives in firms with better performance are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily,
because excellent firm performance affords them significant compensation and a sense of
accomplishment. Firm size is controlled because larger firms generally have a more stable
environment, thus executive turnover is less likely to happen in these firms than in the smaller
firms. Firm growth is controlled as the rate of executive turnover should be lower for firms
with a promising growth prospect. CFO age is controlled because age would be positively
related to the propensity of retirement, which is deemed as one of the scenarios of voluntary
turnover in this study. Executives in firms with a loss in the previous period may have a higher
propensity for voluntary turnover because they either blame themselves for the unsatisfactory
performance or have the intention of finding other employment in a firm with better
performance. The relative managerial power between CFOs and CEOs in the firm is included
because CFOs with relatively higher power may be less likely to resort to voluntary turnover.
They may be more inclined to negotiate with CEOs or the board of directors about their
compensation. Similar to the relative power, CFO duality is controlled because more powerful
CFOs, who also serve on the board, may choose less extreme actions than voluntary turnover

Industry classification methods based on two digits of SIC code and Fama and French (1997) 48-industry categorization
produce similar results. Yet, these methods with more granular industry differentiation significantly reduce the sample size
used in the regression as in some industries the variance in dependent variable is zero.
26
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to restore fairness. Industry and year dummies are included to control for possible industrial
and time trends in voluntary turnover.
3.4 Empirical results
According to my definition, 1.86% of all the observations in Execucomp are defined as
voluntary turnover. This percentage lends credence to the categorization of voluntary turnover
used in this study as Balsam and Miharjo (2007) identify a similar percentage, i.e., 1.82% of
the observations as voluntary turnover. In consideration of voluntary turnover versus forced
turnover, around 80% are defined as voluntary turnover. This percentage is consistent with the
literature. For example, the percentage of forced turnover is 16.2% in Huson et al. (2001), while
in my study this percentage is around 20%, reflecting the facts that forced turnover has been
increased over time (Huson et al. 2001) and I use a stricter definition of voluntary turnover.
[Insert Table 20 around here]
Table 20 shows the descriptive statistics of the observations used in the model. Among the
9,741 observations, there are 97 (around 1%) cases of voluntary turnover, which is consistent
with the argument that voluntary turnover is a rare event. However, this is at odds with Balsam
and Miharjo (2007) who classify 1.82% of the observations as voluntary turnover 27. Other
variables are all in the reasonable range.

27

As there is no compelling evidence to indicate that all cases of executive turnover in the “unknown” category are forced
turnover, in the robustness tests, I alternatively categorize all three types of executive turnover (i.e., “resigned”, “retired”,
and “unknown”) as voluntary to increase the percentage and make it more consistent with the percentage of voluntary
turnover in the literature.
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[Insert Table 21 around here]
Table 21 shows the descriptive statistics of the independent variables for voluntary
turnover (VolTurn=1) and forced turnover (VolTurn=0), respectively. Consistent with my
expectations, CFOs who are perceived to be more unfairly compensated have a significantly
higher propensity for voluntary turnover. Specifically, the t-test with equal variance shows that
the difference between the means is significant at 1% with a t-statistics of 2.7428. Additionally,
the propensity for voluntary turnover is higher for CFOs working in relatively smaller firms
and firms with lower market performance. The possible explanation is that CFOs in smaller
and low-performing firms are incentivized to find another employment in larger firms with
higher performance.
[Insert Table 22 around here]
Table 22 shows the correlational matrix for the variables. Consistent with my hypothesis,
CFOs who are more unfairly compensated have a higher propensity of voluntary turnover.
Except for CFO duality, the directions of the correlation are in line with my prior expectations.
[Insert Table 23 around here]
Table 23 shows the multivariate relationship between the perceived fairness in CFO
compensation and voluntary turnover. The model is statistically significant at 1% with a Chisquared of 292.91. The Pseudo R-squared is 0.2082. The empirical result shows that the

Due to the significant difference between the sample sizes in the two groups, I also conduct a t-test with unequal variance
assumed and find similar result.
28
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propensity of voluntary turnover is higher when CFOs are more unfairly compensated, which
is consistent with my hypothesis. The coefficient is significant at 5% in a two-tailed test, with
a p-value of 0.015. The result is also economically significant. Moving the independent variable
of interest from the mean to the 75th percentile, the propensity for voluntary turnover increases
from 0.2% to 12.60%29. Except for CFO duality, the directions of the relationship are consistent
with my expectations for the control variables. The reason could be that CFOs serving on the
board as directors are more talented and, consequently, have a more promising employment
prospect. As a result, due to the mobility of employment afforded by their talents, voluntary
turnover seems more desirable when facing unfair treatment.
3.5 Additional analysis
3.5.1 The components in CFO compensation
It may be interesting to analyze which component(s) in CFO compensation (i.e., salary, bonus,
and equity-based compensation) drives the results in the main analysis. In other words, it could
be of practical importance to know which component of their compensation package CFOs
value the most in terms of fairness, given that it may have a significant impact on the propensity
of voluntary turnover. The distribution of the three components in CFO compensation for my
sample are around 34%, 5%, and 49%, respectively, which is consistent with the statement that
equity-based compensation has been trending up significantly in recent years.

29

The mean of this variable is negative. It is expected that the propensity for voluntary turnover is very low for CFOs with a
negative value of this variable as they are not perceived to be under-compensated.
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[Insert Table 24 around here]
I first estimate the perceived fairness in three components of CFO compensation,
employing the same method used in the main analysis. Then I regress this continuous measure
of perceived fairness on the same variable set used in Table 23, and the results are shown in the
three columns of Table 24, respectively. The three models are all significant at 1% with pseudo
R-squared around 0.20. It shows that, among the three components of executive compensation,
it is equity-based compensation that drives the significant relationship between the propensity
of voluntary turnover and the perceived fairness in CFO compensation which was found in the
main analysis, the coefficient of which is significant at 1%. The coefficients on salary and
bonus are positive and negative respectively, though not significant30. This result indicates that
CFOs value the fairness in equity-based compensation more than the fairness in salary and
bonus.
3.5.2 The perceived fairness in CEO compensation
Due to a CEO’s significant role in an organization, in the following supplementary analysis I
test to determine whether the perceived fairness in CEO compensation affects their propensity
for voluntary turnover. Similar to CFOs, perceived fairness in CEO compensation is estimated
by regressing CEO total compensation on the same regressors as in Equation 1, Chapter 2 and
the residuals of the regression are used as the proxy31.

The coefficient on bonus should be interpreted with a grain of salt. Since in the sample many CFOs have zero bonus, in
order to preserve the sample size and the power of the test, I replace zero bonus with one then take the natural logarithm.
30

31

The residuals are multiplied by -1 in that a larger residual means that the focal CEO is more unfairly compensated.
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[Insert Table 25 around here]
According to my definition, there are 148 cases of voluntary turnover, which represents
1.49% of the sample used in the regression. The model is significant at 1% with a pseudo Rsquared of 0.2306. The results presented in Table 25 confirm that the relationship between the
propensity of voluntary turnover and the perceived fairness in CEO compensation is not
significant at the conventional level with a p-value of 0.519 in a two-tailed test. This finding is
consistent with my prior expectation that due to the higher managerial power CEOs have over
the board of directors, and the less mobility of employment CEOs are afforded comparative to
CFOs, they are less likely to resort to voluntary turnover when facing unfair treatment. The
significantly negative coefficient on CEO duality also reflects this.
3.6 Robustness tests
3.6.1 Alternative definition of voluntary turnover
In the first robustness test, I replicate the main analysis using an alternative definition of
voluntary turnover. More specifically, in addition to “resigned” and “retired” cases of executive
turnover, I also categorize “unknown” cases as voluntary turnover as I do not have solid
evidence to prove that every case in the “unknown” is forced turnover.
[Insert Table 26 around here]
After including “unknown” cases as voluntary turnover, the percentage increases to 1.27%,
with 124 cases of voluntary turnover in the regression. The model is significant at 1% with a
pseudo R-squared of 0.251. The results in Table 26 show that, though still significantly positive
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with a p-value of 0.068 in a two-tailed test, the significance is mitigated and the magnitude of
the coefficient of interest becomes smaller. This is consistent with my expectation that at least
some cases in the “unknown” category may contain some noise (i.e., forced turnover) that
confounds the relationship between the propensity for voluntary turnover and perceived
fairness in executive compensation.
3.6.2 The relationship between perceived fairness in executive compensation and voluntary
turnover in a lead-lag model
In the main analysis, a contemporaneous regression model is used. As mentioned above, this
practice is consistent with most studies on this topic in the literature, and there is no specific
reason identified in the literature that executives who are unfairly compensated would postpone
their turnover decision by exactly one period.
Yet, there are some studies (e.g., He et al. 2017) that use a lead-lag model to analyze the
relationship between executive compensation and voluntary turnover. In other words, it may
take some time for executives facing unfair treatments to leave the organization, possibly due
to contractual restraints. Therefore, in the second robustness test, I replicate the main analysis
using a lead-lag model by lagging all independent variables by one period. The results are
shown in Table 27.
[Insert Table 27 around here]
The model is significant at 1% with a pseudo R-squared of 0.1531. The sample size is
reduced to 8,114 as the lead-lag model is employed. The above table shows that the coefficient
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on the perceived fairness in CFO compensation is significantly positive at 10% with a p-value
of 0.094 in a two-tailed test. This finding lends credence to the use by some studies of a leadlag model to analyze this relationship. Yet, the reduced significance comparative to that in the
main analysis is consistent with my previous expectation that most CFOs who perceive they
are rewarded unfairly would make the decision of voluntary turnover in the same period as
fairness perceptions are formed.
3.7 Concluding remarks
The current study, as with the other studies, is not without limitations. Firstly, the percentage
of voluntary turnover used in the regression analysis is less than some studies in the literature
(e.g., Balsam and Miharjo 2007), which may limit the generalizability of this study. Therefore,
assuming the rate of voluntary turnover is comparable between CEOs and CFOs, though the
empirical finding is consistent with the hypothesis, it should be interpreted that for some
executives who face unfair financial rewards, the association between the propensity for
voluntary turnover and the strength of unfair perceptions is positive. This phenomenon may or
may not be generalized to all executives. However, the difference in the percentage of voluntary
turnover may be because Balsam and Miharjo (2007), whose sample was taken from 1993 to
2005, use a different sample period from the current study, which is from 2006 to 2020.
Furthermore, this study focuses only on large firms listed in the U.S. (i.e., S&P 1,500), therefore,
it may not be possible to generalize the results to private firms and small-cap public firms in
the U.S., and firms listed in other countries.
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Secondly, voluntary turnover may not be accurately identified in this study. There is no
consensus for the identification of voluntary turnover in the empirical studies. Although some
researchers check news releases with regard to executive turnover to determine whether a
specific occurrence was forced or voluntary, more than often news releases are ambiguous at
best. For example, most studies on this topic regard a case as voluntary turnover when the news
release mentions that the focal executive is employed by another firm. Yet, the researchers
cannot rule out the possibility that the focal executive is fired by the previous employer and
hired by another employer in the same timeframe.
Thirdly, this study is not focused on analyzing the propensity for alternative actions, which
may have a substitutive relationship with voluntary turnover, executives may take to restore
fairness. Executives who perceive they are unfairly treated may choose a wide array of actions,
most of which are probably less extreme and more desirable than voluntary turnover, because
finding another job is often costly to the executives themselves as well as to the firms they
work for. They may choose to simply shirk, negotiate with their direct superiors or the board
of directors, or engage in some activities (e.g., empire building) that are intended to boost their
own reputation in the managerial labor market, but sometimes at the expense of long-term firm
performance and shareholder interests.
Fourthly, it is possible that for some executives there is a delay between the formation of
fairness perceptions regarding compensation and the decision of voluntary turnover. More
specifically, in the first scenario, executives form a perception of fairness regarding their
compensation, and, later in the same period, executives who perceive they are unfairly
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compensated decide to leave the organization with the intention of finding another employment
with fairer financial rewards. This is the scenario used in the main analysis and found in most
research in the literature.
In the second scenario, executives form a perception of fairness about their compensation,
but executives who perceive themselves to be unfairly compensated may postpone their
decision for voluntary turnover to a later period, which could be the next period, or some future
period that cannot be reliably determined in empirical research.
Though the lead-lag model is used in the robustness test to address this issue to some extent,
it cannot be fully dissipated unless the specific date of the formation of fairness perceptions is
clearly identified for every executive who has the intention to voluntarily leave his/her
organization.
Fifthly, the results in this chapter should be interpreted with caution as the dependent
variable (i.e., voluntary turnover) is a rare event. Voluntary turnover is defined as an indicator
and logit estimation method is used in this study, therefore, the coefficients could be biased as
the probability of the rare event could be sharply underestimated by logistic regressions (King
and Zeng 2001). In other words, logistic regressions used in this study may not be able to
accurately quantify the effect of perceived fairness in executive compensation on voluntary
turnover, and the observed coefficient in Table 22 could be significantly underestimated.
Social comparison process (Festinger 1954) identifies the preference of individuals for
fairness and the incentive to restore fairness when they receive unfair treatments. Social
132

comparison process also states that if individuals perceive they are unfairly rewarded, they
might reduce the inputs (e.g., efforts) into work. The current study draws upon this process and
hypothesizes an association between the strength of unfair perceptions and the propensity for
voluntary turnover, which functions as a way of reducing inputs on the more extreme end.
The findings support this hypothesis that the strength of unfair perceptions regarding CFO
compensation is positively associated with the propensity for voluntary turnover. Additionally,
in terms of different components in executive compensation, the fairness in equity-based
compensation is a more significant driver than the fairness in salary and bonus for voluntary
turnover. This relationship does not apply to CEOs as CEOs, who arguably wield higher
managerial power than CFOs in an organization, do not have to resort to this type of extreme
action for the sake of fairness. This result is robust to an alternative definition of voluntary
turnover and an alternative model specification.
There are several potentially fruitful avenues that future interested researchers could take
to expand the understanding on the applicability of social comparison process in a principalagent setting. Firstly, in addition to voluntary turnover, studies could focus on the alternative
actions executives who perceive they are unfairly compensated may take for the sake of
fairness (e.g., Clark et al. 2009), particularly those actions related to reduced work effort.
Compared to voluntary turnover, which functions as a last resort to restore fairness, the
relationship between alternative actions and perceived fairness in executive compensation
could be more significant.
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Secondly, future research could delve into the timing of the actions taken by executives
who perceive they are unfairly compensated. More specifically, interested researchers could
analyze if executives engage in actions for the sake of fairness in the same period as they
perceive they are unfairly treated. It is also possible that some executives with a different
disposition (e.g., Stoian and Rialp-Criado 2010) tend to act on the unfair treatment at a future
date, thus there is a delay between the formation of fairness perceptions and the action for
restoring fairness. A detailed analysis on the relationship between the dispositional
characteristics of executives and their propensity for actions to restore fairness could be
achieved by experimental or survey research.
Thirdly, to test the applicability of social comparison process, it may be promising to
analyze if the relationship found in the current study holds in other cultural backgrounds. For
example, it may be interesting to analyze if the propensity for more “aggressive” actions is
lower in collectivist societies in comparison to individualist societies (e.g., Mattila and
Patterson 2004), or if the employees in the former are more inclined to use amicable methods,
such as negotiating with their superiors, to solve the problem of fairness.
Lastly, although CEOs are not the focus of the current study and the main finding is not
applicable to CEOs, it might be interesting to analyze what actions CEOs are inclined to engage
in when they receive unfair treatment (e.g., He et al. 2017). Nevertheless, it is expected that,
due to their significant role and power in an organization, CEOs may be less likely to be treated
unfairly than other executives in the top management team.
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Table 19 Descriptives for the model estimating the relation between voluntary turnover and perceived CFO underpayment
Variables
VolTurn
UNDERPAID
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Growth
CFOAGE
Loss
Relative power
CFO duality

Obs

Mean

9,741
9,741
9,741
9,741
9,741
9,741
9,741
9,741
9,741
9,741

0.010
-0.004
0.053
0.130
8.063
3.307
51.46
0.140
0.438
0.116

Median
0
-0.038
0.051
0.102
7.976
2.208
51
0
0.370
0

s.d.

Min

0.099
0.492
0.087
0.418
1.735
3.906
6.480
0.347
0.325
0.320

0
-1.195
-0.296
-0.748
4.144
0.394
36
0
0.061
0

25 percentile

75 percentile

0
-0.317
0.013
-0.127
6.824
1.391
47
0
0.283
0

0
0.279
0.094
0.332
9.184
3.622
56
0
0.497
0

Max
1
1.392
0.324
1.757
13.03
30.08
67
1
2.643
1

VolTurn is voluntary turnover, defined as “resigned” and “retired” cases of executive turnover;
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is firms’ market performance, which is proxied by annualized stock returns;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period; Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFO’s age;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise
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Table 20 Differences in independent variables between voluntary and forced turnover

Variables
UNDERPAID
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Growth
CFOAGE
Loss
Relative power
CFO duality

Forced Turnover
Obs
Mean
9,644
9,644
9,644
9,644
9,644
9,644
9,644
9,644
9,644

-0.005
0.053
0.132
8.066
3.312
51.44
0.139
0.439
0.115

Voluntary Turnover
Obs
Mean
97
97
97
97
97
97
97
97
97

t-statistics

0.133
0.043
-0.064
7.768
2.839
53.06
0.155
0.420
0.196

-2.74***
1.13
4.59***
1.68*
1.19
-2.45***
-0.43
0.55
-2.47**

VolTurn is voluntary turnover, defined as “resigned” and “retired” cases of executive turnover;
Forced turnover is defined as “unknown” and “deceased” cases of executive turnover;
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is firms’ market performance, which is proxied by annualized stock returns;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period; Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFO’s age;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise
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Table 21 Correlational matrix for the relation between voluntary turnover and perceived fairness in CFO compensation

VolTurn

VolTurn
UNDERPAID
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Growth
CFOAGE
Loss
Relative power
CFO duality

1
0.03***
-0.01
-0.05***
-0.02*
-0.01
0.02**
0.004
-0.006
0.03**

UNDERPAID

1
0.003
0.002
-0.015
-0.005
-0.003
-0.021**
-0.007
0.006

FirmFinPerf

FirmMktPerf

1
0.18***
0.02**
0.25***
0.005
-0.38***
-0.05***
0.018*

1
-0.04***
0.19***
0.013
0.05***
-0.013
0.015

FirmSize

Growth

CFOAGE

Loss

1
-0.02*
0.05***
-0.19***
-0.09***
-0.02*

1
0.03***
-0.07***
-0.01
0.001

1
-0.008
0.013
0.04***

1
0.05***
-0.02*

Relative
power

1
0.10***

CFO
duality

1

VolTurn is voluntary turnover, defined as “resigned” and “retired” cases of executive turnover;
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is firms’ market performance, which is proxied by annualized stock returns;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period; Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFO’s age;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise
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Table 22 The relationship between voluntary turnover and perceived fairness in CFO
compensation
Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 )
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽9 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛴𝛽𝑚 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑚 + 𝛴𝛽𝑛 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

Dependent variable

Expected Sign

UNDERPAID
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Growth
CFOAGE
Loss
Relative power
CFO duality

VolTurn

+
+
+
-

0.531**
-1.122
-0.711**
0.011
0.002
0.067***
0.252
-0.391
0.464*

Industry dummy
Year dummy

controlled
controlled

N
Pseudo R-squared
Chi-Squared

9,741
0.2082
292.91***

The estimation method of logit is used
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%
VolTurn is voluntary turnover, defined as “resigned” and “retired” cases of executive turnover;
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is firms’ market performance, which is proxied by annualized stock returns;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFO’s age;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise

138

Table 23 Voluntary turnover and perceived fairness in the various components of
CFO compensation

CFO compensation

UNDERPAID
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Growth
CFOAGE
Loss
Relative power
CFO duality
Year dummies
Industry dummies
N
Pseudo R-squared
Chi-Squared

Salary

Bonus

0.447
-0.982
-0.738**
-0.002
0.001
0.068***
0.226
-0.428
0.456*
controlled
controlled

Equity

-0.022
-0.967
-0.728**
-0.008
0.0001
0.069***
0.215
-0.464
0.459*
controlled
controlled

9,741
0.2037
292.36***

0.605***
-1.153
-0.711**
0.016
0.002
0.067***
0.254
-0.377
0.467*
controlled
controlled

9,741
0.2022
287.59***

9,741
0.2100
292.91***

Salary is the cash compensation for the period;
Bonus is the compensation rewarded to CFOs when certain financial performance is achieved;
Equity compensation consists of stock grants and option grants for the period;
VolTurn is voluntary turnover, defined as “resigned” and “retired” cases of executive turnover;
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is firms’ market performance, which is proxied by annualized stock returns;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFO’s age;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise
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Table 24 The relation between voluntary
turnover and perceived fairness in CEO pay
Dependent variable
UNDERPAID_CEO
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Growth
CEOAGE
Loss
Relative power
CEO duality
Industry dummy
Year dummy
N
Pseudo R-squared
Chi-squared

VolTurn
-0.091
-1.510
-0.447
0.335***
0.0003
0.042***
0.076
-0.010
-0.815***
Controlled
Controlled
9,928
0.2306
494.66***

VolTurn is voluntary turnover, defined as “resigned” and “retired” cases of executive turnover;
UNDERPAID_CEO is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1, using total CEO pay;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is firms’ market performance, which is proxied by annualized stock returns;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CEOAGE is the CEO’s age;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
CEO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CEO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise
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Table 25 The relation between voluntary turnover and perceived fairness in CFO pay
using alternative definition of voluntary turnover
Dependent variable

VolTurn

UNDERPAID
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Growth
CFOAGE
Loss
Relative power
CFO duality

0.381*
-2.218*
-0.674**
0.078
0.008
0.073***
0.426
-0.518
0.380

Industry dummy
Year dummy

Controlled
Controlled

N
Pseudo R-squared
Chi-Squared

9,741
0.251
346.19***

VolTurn is voluntary turnover, in this model defined as “resigned”, “retired”, and “unknown” cases of executive turnover;
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is firms’ market performance, which is proxied by annualized stock returns;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFO’s age;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise
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Table 26 The relation between voluntary turnover and
perceived fairness in CFO compensation in a lead-lag model
Dependent variable
UNDERPAID
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Growth
CFOAGE
Loss
Relative power
CFO duality

VolTurn_t+1
0.510*
-1.902
0.08
-0.017
-0.014
0.052*
0.072
-0.078
0.827**

Industry dummy
Year dummy

Controlled
Controlled

N
Pseudo R-squared
F-statistics

8,114
0.1531
195.81***

VolTurn is voluntary turnover, defined as “resigned” and “retired” cases of executive turnover;
UNDERPAID is a continuous variable that equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1;
FirmFinPerf is return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the period;
FirmMktPerf is firms’ market performance, which is proxied by annualized stock returns;
FirmSize is the natural log of total assets at the end of the period;
Leverage is total debts over total assets at the end of the period;
Growth is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of equity at the end of the period;
CFOAGE is the CFO’s age;
Loss is an indicator that equals one if the previous year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise;
Relative power is the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm;
CFO duality is an indicator that equals one when the CFO also serves on the board, and zero otherwise
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Appendix Definitions of the main variables in alphabetical order
Variable name
Analysts
Big4
Capital_needs
CFOAGE
CFOComp
CFO duality
DA
FirmFinPerf
FirmMktPerf
FirmSize
Gender
Growth
Horizon
Leverage
Loss
Relative power
StockHold
Stockvolatility
Tenure
UNDERPAID
VolTurn

Definition
the number of financial analysts following the firm
an indicator equals 1 if one of the largest 4 auditors is employed, zero otherwise
an indicator equals 1 if the firm is in need of external financing, zero otherwise
CFO's age
natural logarithm of total CFO compensation for the period
an indicator equals 1 when the CFO also serves on the board
discretionary accruals using modified Jones model
return on assets, calculated as net income over total assets at the beginning of the
period
annualized stock returns
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the period
an indicator equals 1 when the CFO is male, zero when female
market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity over book value of
equity at the end of the period
an indicator equals 1 when the CFO is 65 years old or beyond, zero otherwise
financial leverage, calculated as total debts over total assets at the end of the
period
an indicator equals 1 if net income in the previous year is negative, zero otherwise
the ratio between CFO compensation and CEO compensation in the same firm
natural logarithm of CFO’s stock holdings at the end of the period
standard deviation of monthly holding returns for the period
the number of years the CFO is with the firm
a continuous variable equals the residuals from Eq.1 multiplied by -1
an indicator equals 1 if the reasons for CFO turnover are identified as "resigned"
and "retired" in Execucomp
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